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ASYMMETRIC DYNAMISM AND ACCEPTABLE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION 
AWARDS 
 
Jeffrey W. Stempel
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Law aspires (at least in large part) to consistency and predictability.
1
  The genius 
of the common law was in part the benefits of treating like cases alike.
2
   Although the 
post-modern, multi-faceted legal profession of today may not always agree on the 
similarity or difference of cases,
3
 much less correct outcomes,
4
 one would expect at least 
                                                 
*
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1
  Law of course also has many other aspirations as well:  fact-finding; enforcing legal rights; justice; 
fostering adequate incentives and sounder public policy, to name a few.  Rank ordering them is well 
beyond the scope of this article.  But without doubt, a substantial segment of the legal community places 
consistency and predictability high on the list of laws goals.  See, e.g., WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL 
ANALYST:  A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW 60-65 (2007) (claiming that law favors objective 
standards that enhance predictability and minimize discretion and attendant costs); Kelly Casey Mullally, 
Legal (Un)Certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1112 (2010) (“Concern 
for certainty is ubiquitous in the law. Some degree of determinacy in the content and application of 
governing rules is necessary for individuals to identify the scope of their rights and to ensure that their 
conduct conforms to legal constraints, at least in contexts where ex ante decision making is possible. The 
law forms the basis for many social and economic expectations, and legal thinkers naturally have some 
interest in certainty.  Certainty, in terms of predictability of results, is necessary to view law-making 
institutions as legitimate sources of authority.  Lawyers should be able to use the law as a guide to what 
courts will do in future cases; otherwise, a lack of certainty can cause the public to abandon legal 
institutions.”); Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common 
Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 423 (1999) (“A virtue of the common law method is that it enables us to 
proceed without resolving fundamental questions of value by limiting the issues on which conflicts in 
values are worked out to a manageable set that is fluid over time. A useful way to think of the common law 
is as a set of institutional mechanisms for resolving private disputes that attempts to be at once stable and 
mutable: stable, because of the high value placed within the system on tradition and conformity; mutable, 
because of the ineffable and fluid character of its rules, standards, and principles.”); Keith N. Hylton, Fee 
Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 427 (1995). 
2
  See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 13 (1982). 
3
  See Richard S. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 761, 765 (1987) (noting “remarkable political consensus of the late 1950s and early 1960s” that was in 
tune with the strong consensus of the law as reflected in the Harvard Legal Process school championed by 
Hart and Sacks). 
 
Since 1940, and especially since 1952, there had been little ideological difference 
between the major parties.  At least in the academy, the radical right had been discredited, 
first by its isolationism and then by its racism, and the radical left had been squashed by 
the Cold War.  Secular, humanistic, patriotic, and centrist, the American intellectual 
scene in the late 1950s and early 1960s was remarkably free from ideological strife. 
 
2 
 
that courts would hew to roughly the same methodology across cases, aspects of a single 
case, or sections of a specific statute.   This is not to say that there will never be 
jurisprudential differences between “mainstream” judges.
5
  We know, for example, that 
Justice Scalia is a textualist when approaching statutes (and legal texts generally)
6
 while 
Justice Breyer gives substantial consideration to legislative intent and the views of 
administrative agencies.
7
  But despite these differences, one would expect the Supreme 
Court as a whole to be at least relatively consistent when addressing the same statute. 
However, since the Court’s embrace of arbitration in the mid-1980s, it has tended 
to apply a dynamic, expansive model of statutory construction when considering the 
question of when to enforce pre-dispute arbitration clauses but applied a different 
standard to questions regarding the conduct of arbitration and review of arbitration 
awards, a standard grounded more in history and tradition.
8
  
When deciding whether to require arbitration, the court has not been very 
concerned, if at all, about achieving the legislature’s intent or even the language of the 
statute.  Instead, the Court has applied a highly relaxed notion of consent in enforcing 
even the most boilerplate of arbitration clauses upon unsophisticated disputants who had 
little bargaining power in the transaction that led to the contract containing the arbitration 
                                                 
* * * 
[Even] many of the leading [legal] realists had been coopted into the judiciary and into 
the drafting of uniform laws and other mainstream legal activities, [and] it was widely 
believed that the law had been restored to a position of political neutrality. 
 
Id. at 765-766.  See also DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY:  ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL IDEAS 
IN THE FIFTIES (1960). 
4
 In the quarter-century since Posner commented on the decline of law as an autonomous discipline, 
American politics has if anything become more discordant.  See Thomas B. Edsall, Studies: Conservatives 
Are From Mars, Liberals Are From Venus, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 6, 2012, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/02/studies-conservatives-are-from-mars-liberals-are-
from-venus/252416/; Thomas B. Edsall, The Culture War and the Jobs Crisis, CAMPAIGN STOPS (Nov. 11, 
2012, 10:45 PM), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/edsall-the-culture-war-and-the-jobs-
crisis/ (“In a study based on 2008 polling, Abramowitz found majorities or solid pluralities of voters 
formed consistently liberal or conservative views – not centrist positions – on a continuum of issues 
including gay rights and abortion; off-shore oil drilling; the Iraq war; health care; financial regulation; 
climate change and mortgage assistance to low-income homeowners.”); ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., RED 
STATE, BLUE STATE, RICH STATE POOR STATE (2008). 
5
 The mainstream in American law is fairly broad and can be seen as running from Bork himself on the 
right (notwithstanding Bork’s nomination defeat) to the late NYU Law and Oxford Professor Ronald 
Dworkin, a strong advocate of government-supported equality on the left.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 428 (1990) (discussing an observation first made in Posner, The Decline of 
Law as an Autonomous Discipline, supra note 3, at 766).  Compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX (1978) (suggesting constrained view of antitrust enforcement and perhaps even that antitrust 
legislation was a mistake); with RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978) (taking expansive 
view of what law demands in terms of individual civil rights and permits in terms of government 
intervention to benefit the disempowered in programs such as affirmative action). 
6
 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW:  THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 1-
46 (2012). 
7
 See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 
845, 847 (1992) (supporting use of legislative history as tool for statutory construction) [hereinafter On the 
Uses of Legislative History]; accord Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review:  A Practicing Judge’s Perspective, 
78 TEX. L. REV. 761, 766 (2000) (same) [hereinafter Judicial Review]. 
8
 See infra notes 159-260 and accompanying text. 
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clause.
9
  But when the issue concerns arbitration administration such as the power of the 
arbitrators to give class-wide treatment to a dispute, or limitations on the sweep of the 
Federal Arbitration Act,
10
 the Court has taken the opposite approach, restricting class 
treatment,
11
 narrowing the seemingly clear text of a provision excepting workers from the 
Act,
12
 or resisting expanded review of awards even if agreed to by the parties.
13
 
This inconsistency – loving arbitration one minute when essentially cramming 
down a mass arbitration clause upon consumers in the next minute while overturning the 
decision of three experienced commercial arbitrators to process a price-fixing dispute on 
a class-wide basis
14
 – is hard to square with traditional notions of sound jurisprudence.  
Cynics can be forgiven for concluding that the only apparent unifying principle of the 
                                                 
9
  See infra notes 116-118, 131-177 and accompanying text.  This relaxed attitude toward consent and 
willingness to impose contract terms even in cases of highly questionable consent extends beyond the 
Court’s arbitration precedents.  See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (enforcing 
pre-printed forum selection clause in small type on the back of a cruise ship ticket).  See Cheryl B. Preston 
& Eli McCann, Llewellyn Slept Here: A Short History of Sticky Contracts and Feudalism, 91 OR. L. REV. 
129, 167-70 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court has championed a relaxed notion of consent in 
enforcing boilerplate text in receipt-like documents such as mailing inserts and confirmations as though the 
language had been consciously negotiated by the parties); see also Charles L. Knapp, Contract Law Walks 
the Plank:  Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 12 NEV. L.J. 553 (2012); Linda S. Mullenix, Carnival 
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute:  The Titanic of Worst Decisions, 12 NEV. L.J. 549 (2012) (labeling Shute one of 
the worst Supreme Court decisions in history); see also Symposium, The Worst Supreme Court Case 
Ever?, 12 NEV. L.J. 516 (2012). 
10
 United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1-16 (2006) (originally enacted in 1925 and effective 
January 1, 1926; with only largely minor amendments in 1954, 1970, 1988, 1990, and 2002).  The Court in 
its decisions often uses the short form of “FAA” for the Act, which is grating and even confusing.  At least 
prior to the modern era of substantial Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence, the anagram FAA was 
synonymous with “Federal Aviation Administration,” and so it will remain in this article, where the Act 
will be referred to as the “Act” or the “Federal Arbitration Act”. 
11
  See e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (discussed infra notes 225-
260 and accompanying text); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) 
(discussed infra notes 206-218 and accompanying text).  See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted Love:  
Arbitral Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 795 (2012) 
(noting that although the Court his almost romantically attached to arbitration as a dispute resolution device 
and to the enforcement of mass arbitration clauses, it exhibits opposition to arbitral power should that result 
in greater procedural protections for the more disempowered disputant) [hereinafter Tainted Love].  On the 
distinction between traditional commercial arbitration and the new “mass” arbitration reflected in 
boilerplate arbitration clauses contained on the back of contracts or enclosed with billing statements, see 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Fairness in Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 383 (2008) 
[hereinafter Mandating Minimum Fairness]. 
12
 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (discussed infra notes 190-98 and 
accompanying text); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (discussed infra notes 
169-78 and accompanying text); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract 
Exclusion in Section I of the Federal Arbitration Act:  Correcting the Judiciary’s Failure of Statutory 
Vision, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 253 (1991). 
13
 See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (discussed infra notes 202-211 
and accompanying text).  See Nicholas R. Weiskopf & Matthew S. Mulqueen, Hall Street, Judicial Review 
of Arbitral Awards, and Federal Preemption, 29 REV. LITIG. 361 (2010); Richard C. Reuben, Personal 
Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1103 (2009); Alan Scott Rau, Fear of 
Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 469 (2006). 
14
  Which is what the Court (or at least a 5-4 majority) did in Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. 662. See 
discussion infra notes 206-18 and accompanying text. 
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Court’s modern arbitration jurisprudence is that the more politically, socially, or 
economically powerful disputant is more likely to prevail than disputants with 
comparatively lower political, social, or economic capital.
15
 
The pro-business, pro-establishment, pro-powerful tendencies of the Rehnquist 
and particularly the more conservative Roberts Courts are well chronicled.
16
  Although I 
would prefer a Court (e.g., the Warren Court) that had more pro-underdog tendencies
17
 or 
at least something centrist akin to the Burger Court,
18
 I realize that victors in political 
wars claim legal spoils like judicial appointments just as they are permitted to choose 
ambassadors and cabinet members.  Republican victories in five of the past nine elections 
and the episodic timing of judicial retirements has, along with the increasing 
conservatism of Justice Kennedy,
19
 created the current Roberts Court, generally 
considered the most conservative since the early years of the New Deal,
20
 and one which 
                                                 
15
   See Tainted Love, supra note 11, at 800-03 (discussing how the Supreme Court’s inconsistent 
approaches and outcomes can be harmonized only by noting that the Court consistently favors the disputant 
with greater social, economic, and political power). 
16
 See id. at 797, n. 9 (citing commentary on pro-business orientation of the modern Court); see 
generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION (2010) (including 
pages 227-28, criticism of Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams).   
17
 The Warren Court was often criticized as resulted-oriented and insufficiently faithful to traditional 
legal principles and precedent, largely because of its enlargement of criminal defendant rights and 
restrictions on state power, particularly regarding civil rights.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A 
Remembrance of Things Past?: Reflections on the Warren Court and the Struggle for Civil Rights, 59 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1055, 1057-58 (2002) (discussing the “ends-justify-the means approach” of the 
Warren Court); JOHN DENTON CARTER, THE WARREN COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL VIEW 
OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (1973); ARCHIBALD COX, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN 
INSTRUMENT OF REFORM (1968); LOUIS LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME 
COURT’S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION (1975).  But as the ensuing four decades have shown, 
conservative justices are at least as capable of eschewing precedent and being result-oriented as are liberal 
justices. 
18
 Although more conservative than the Warren Court, the Burger Court was not as dramatically 
conservative as some had expected when President Richard Nixon appointed Burger to replace retiring Earl 
Warren against the backdrop of Nixon’s strong criticism of the Warren Court during the 1968 presidential 
campaign.  See VINCENT BLASI, THE BURGER COURT:  THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T (1983). 
19
 See Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Is the Roberts Court Especially Activist?  A Study of 
Invalidating (and Upholding) Federal, State, and Local Laws, 61 EMORY L.J. 737, 757 (2012) (“If, 
however, we consider only laws reviewed by the Court since the start of the Roberts Court years, even 
Kennedy's ideology shows in his votes—he too is now substantially more likely to strike liberal laws than 
conservative laws.”).  But see Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Moving Beyond Its Old Divides, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 30, 2012, at A1 (“[In the 2011-12 term,] [t]he court decided 15 cases by 5-to-4 votes, roughly in line 
with earlier terms. . . . What was striking this year was that Justice Kennedy, a moderate conservative, 
swung right and left an equal number of times. Since 2000, there have been only two terms in which Justice 
Kennedy did not vote with the conservatives at least 60 percent of the time in such ideologically divided 
cases.”). 
20
 See CHERMINSKY, supra note 16.  The Court of 1932-37, which struck down several New Deal 
measures prior to the “switch in time” that “saved nine” in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 
(1937) rivaled and perhaps exceeded the Roberts Court in conservatism.  See NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS 
115-21 (2011) (describing events of the time).  For example, the current Court narrowly upheld the 
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act (in National Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012)) while the Court of the 1930s did invalidate several pieces of similar legislation passed by a 
Democratic administration.  And although the contract jurisprudence of the Roberts Court is quite 
conservative, it has not returned to the attitudes of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which struck 
5 
 
seems to have a solid working five-vote majority in favor of compelling arbitration (but 
not expansive arbitration unless desired by the more advantaged disputant) on most hotly 
contested matters.
21
 
But being a traditionalist, I continue to think of law as capable of producing less 
partisan and more logically sound outcomes than legislatures or the executive branch, 
even as the membership of the bench and political attitudes may change.  On a structural 
level, it is of course legitimate to have the Roberts Court in charge.  To paraphrase one-
time California Senator S.I. Hayakawa on the Panama Canal:  “We stole it fair and 
square.”
22
  The election of George W. Bush (the President appointing Justices Roberts 
and Alito) was not America’s finest hour due to the controversies and protracted legal 
battles surrounding his election, which was effectively decided by a five-member 
majority of the Court most closely allied with Bush’s political party.
23
  But Bush was 
nonetheless President for eight years with the power to appoint whomever he pleased to 
the Court, just as the Senate had the prerogative of resisting or confirming.   
Regardless of the inevitability of political differences from justice to justice and 
Court to Court, one would hope that conservative and liberal justices alike would at least 
play within the acknowledged rules of the profession and temper their personal 
preferences according to prevailing judicial norms.  One norm I advance in this article is 
that the Court’s approach to statutory construction should be consistent – at least when 
examining a single statute – unless there is a powerful reason to apply different 
interpretative methodologies to different sections of the law in question.  In other words, 
if a one takes a textualist approach to Section X of a statute, it should similarly take a 
textualist approach to Section Y.  Conversely, if the Court focuses on legislative intent or 
other factors when viewing Section X, the same approach should be taken when 
addressing Section Y. 
But, as outlined below, the Court has tended to shift statutory approaches when 
moving from section to section or issue to issue concerning the Federal Arbitration Act.  
It has been a “dynamic” interpreter, using approaches generally associated with left-
leaning scholars when wishing to encourage arbitration
24
 while invoking a more 
                                                 
down state regulation on employment conditions as a violation of substantive due process because of 
interference with employer-employee “contracting.”   
21
 See infra notes 129-260 and accompanying text (discussing Court’s arbitration cases). 
22
 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN QUOTATIONS 270 (Hugh Rawson & Margaret Miner eds., 
2d ed. 2006); James Reston, Panama:  What’s the Rush?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1977, at A21. 
23
   See e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  See also STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF 
LAWYERS:  STATUTES AND STANDARDS 496-97 (7th ed. 2005) (describing Republican ties of the Bush v. 
Gore majority, including possibility that Justice O’Connor may have been interested in Bush’s installation 
so that she could retire and have her successor named by a Republican president, although she did not retire 
until after Bush was re-elected in 2004). In the accompanying Teacher’s Manual, however, Professor 
Gillers rejects all the contentions that Republican-appointed Justices Scalia, Thomas and O’Conner of the 
majority should have recused); Mark S. Brodin, Bush v. Gore:  The Worst (or at Least Second-to-the-
Worst) Supreme Court Decision Ever, 12 NEV. L.J. 563 (2012) (deeming the decision one of the Court’s 
all-time “worsts” in a symposium on the topic); Christopher Bryant, Haste Makes Waste, NEV. LAWYER, 
May 2001, at 18 (criticizing the decision). 
24
 See infra notes 129-168, 180-189, 199-205, 219-260 and accompanying text (describing Court’s 
emphasis on expanding arbitrability in decisions). 
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tradition-bound approach to arbitral powers and procedures.
25
  At this juncture of the 
Federal Arbitration Act’s history, there is no realistic possibility of a retrenchment in the 
expansive scope of the Act encouraged by the Court since 1984.
26
  But going forward, 
one would hope that the Court would become more consistent in its approach to all 
aspects of the Act. 
One simple move the Court could make to achieve greater consistency would be 
to permit review of arbitration awards more informed by the substantive law governing 
the dispute – particularly when the arbitration under review is not the type of commercial 
arbitration conducted within an industry or trade as was the case when the law was 
enacted in 1925.
27
  Currently, an arbitration award can be set aside only under fairly 
extreme circumstances, such as bias or corruption of an arbitrator.
28
  But this limited 
scope of review came into existence when the typical arbitration involved merchants with 
commercial disputes, often merchants that would continue to do business in the future 
and operating according to informal norms particular to their lines of work.
29
  Applied to 
that type of traditional arbitration, limited review made sense.  But in the more modern 
world of mass arbitration that often involves a merchant against a consumer and where 
the merchants effectively direct the dispute resolution to an arbitration forum of their 
choice, overly deferential review of arbitration awards may impose injustices that the 
Congress enacting the Act would not have tolerated.
30
 
My proposal is fairly simple:  now that the Court has taken a dynamic and 
expansive approach to the Act regarding the imposition of arbitration, it should also apply 
a more dynamic and expansive approach to questions of the conduct, scope, and review 
                                                 
25
 See infra notes 169-178, 190-198, 206-218 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s more 
traditional and limited approach when faced with questions concerning the scope, procedure, or judicial 
review of arbitration). 
26
  See infra notes 131-151 and accompanying text (identifying 1984 decision in Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) as the inauguration of the Court’s modern, largely pro-arbitration 
jurisprudence). 
27
  The Act was passed at the urging of commercial interests, who had grown frustrated with the undue 
tendency of some courts to refuse to enforce clearly agreed upon arbitration clauses among merchants on 
the ground that such clauses violated public policy by “ousting” the court of jurisdiction.  See Larry J. 
Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act:  The Supreme Court’s Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare 
Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 799 (2002); Jonathan A. Marcantel, The 
Crumbled Difference Between Legal and Illegal Arbitration Awards:  Hall Street Associates and the 
Waning Public Policy Exception, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 597, 601 (2009); Jeffrey W. Stempel,  
Pitfalls of Public Policy:  The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 259, 277 (1990). 
28
  See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (governing vacating of arbitration awards) and § 11 (governing 
confirmation of arbitration awards); infra notes 265-268 and accompanying text (describing judicial review 
of arbitration awards in more detail). 
29
 See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:  Rethinking the Code’s Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1803 (1996); see also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of 
the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 149 
(1992). 
30
  See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text (describing background, context and original intent of 
the Act as dealing with commercial arbitration among merchants familiar with it and desiring arbitration).  
In contrast, modern “mass” arbitration often involves types of claims and litigants not envisioned when the 
Act was passed.  See Stempel, Mandating Minimum Fairness, supra note 11, at 396 (separating “old” or 
traditional commercial and mercantile arbitration envisioned by the enacting Congress from modern “new” 
or “mass” arbitration of consumer or employment disputes made possible since the 1980s because of 
Supreme Court’s dynamic expansion of the scope of the Act). 
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of the arbitration and its results.   Most important, if perhaps controversial, the Court 
should revive and expand the “manifest disregard of existing law” ground for vacating or 
modifying arbitration awards,
31
 and treat review of mass arbitration no differently than 
review of a trial court decision.  This would entail subjecting arbitral fact finding to a 
“clearly erroneous” standard of review while reviewing legal decisions not implicitly 
intended to be governed by guild or industry norms to at least modest de novo review to 
ensure the arbitral tribunal’s correct understanding and application of applicable law. 
Part II of this article outlines the major schools of statutory construction.  Part III 
reviews the Court’s modern arbitration jurisprudence, outlining the Court’s inconsistency 
of interpretative approaches in arbitration cases.   Part IV suggests a modernized 
alternative approach to the traditional deference accorded to arbitrators in judicial review. 
II. METHODS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
Even if judges cannot always agree about the precise contours of “the law” by 
which we will be ruled, they usually can agree on the rules of the legal process, in 
particular approaches to construing statutes, assessing constitutional concerns, stare 
decisis, and application of precedent.  The legal system embraces a reasonably concrete 
set of basic ground rules for statutory construction.
32
  The Supreme Court Justices 
similarly embrace – or at least say that they embrace – these mainstream judicial 
approaches.
33
   Justices in the majority in most of the arbitration cases of the past 30 years 
are particularly likely to style themselves as mainstream and resist allegations of judicial 
activism,
34
 although their application of mainstream jurisprudence may often have a 
conservative slant in many cases.
35
 
                                                 
31
 See infra notes 277-80 and accompanying text (describing the manifest disregard of existing law 
ground used by some courts to vacate arbitration awards under some circumstances). 
32
 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON LEGISLATION:  STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 587-846 (4th ed. 2007)(describing 
mainstream approaches to statutory construction based on law’s text, legislative background, purpose, and 
function; although different judges attach different weights to these indicia of statutory meaning, almost all 
agree that these factors must be examined and fairly applied as part of the process of statutory 
construction).  See also id. at 847-1100 (discussing widely accepted “Rules, Presumptions and Canons of 
Statutory Construction” as well as accepted “Extrinsic Sources for Statutory Interpretation, including 
legislative background”). 
33
 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, Appendix B (citing Court decisions in which basic 
mainstream rules of statutory construction, including use of canons of meaning and construction are 
regularly invoked); see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI.  L. REV. 1175, 
1184-85 (1989) (expressing support for strict textual reading of law, following established doctrine, and 
deferring to original understanding of laws) [hereinafter Rule of Law]; Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative 
History, supra note 7; Breyer, Judicial Review, supra note 7.  See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW 
JUDGES THINK  Chs. 1-4 (2008) (expressing very legal realist view of the judicial process that includes a 
chapter devoted to “The Supreme Court as a Political Court” but nonetheless also observing widespread 
judicial embrace of mainstream legal principles and strong tendency of jurists to wish to be perceived as 
fair-minded, mainstream, and not excessively political, partisan, or result-oriented). 
34
 TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 358-61, 380-432 
(2001) (discussing backgrounds and professional and public view of mainstream judicial approaches, of 
Justices, William Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White, Thurgood Marshall, Warren E. Burger, Harry 
Blackmun, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, 
Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, all Justices 
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This judicial center of gravity seems particularly well established in matters of 
statutory interpretation.  Although the Court’s major arbitration cases present a range of 
legal questions, all are in the main statutory construction cases focusing on the proper 
application of the Federal Arbitration Act, sometimes alone or sometimes in combination 
or arguable conflict with other statutes.  Regarding statutory construction, the Supreme 
Court during the same period that it has longingly embraced arbitration, has also 
professed fidelity to a statutory construction regime emphasizing the following 
interpretative tools. 
A. Statutory Text 
Mainstream legal thought places substantial emphasis on statutory text and the 
Court has repeatedly stated that the starting point for assessing a statute such as the 
Federal Arbitration Act is its text.
36
  Justice Antonin Scalia is famous for his heavily 
textualist brand of statutory construction that looks almost exclusively at the text of the 
statute and eschews examination of the legislative history of the law or its overall 
purpose.
37
  But even non-textualists such as Justice Stephen Breyer (a comparative fan of 
                                                 
participating in the Court’s modern arbitration decisions during the period from 1980 to the present). I am 
not naively suggesting that there are no significant jurisprudential differences between the Justices.  On the 
contrary, some are distinctly more liberal or more conservative, more formalist or functionalist, more 
textual or more contextual than others.  See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS:  A 
HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II (5th ed. 2008) 
(providing a particularly candid and realistic history of the degree to which ideological, jurisprudential, 
political and even partisan factors played a role in the appointment and confirmation process).  But 
notwithstanding the very real differences between the Justices, a review of their backgrounds demonstrates 
that all qualify as “mainstream” judicial actors in that they purport to agree on basic premises of the legal 
process and do not espouse “impermissible” views that would have threatened or precluded nomination and 
confirmation. 
35
 I am thinking in particular of Justices such as Warren Burger, Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony 
Kennedy, David Souter, and even Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence 
Thomas, and Samuel Alito.  All of these Justices are generally characterized as judicial conservatives, 
particularly the latter four.  See ABRAHAM, supra note 34, Chs. 11-13; HALL, supra note 34, at 384-423.  
But none are described as so conservative as to fall outside the judicial mainstream or accused of espousing 
views inconsistent with the basic legal canon.  But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16 (suggesting that in 
practice and application, the current conservative Justices are rendering decisions inconsistent with the 
Constitution). 
36
 See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at 765-98, App. B, p. 19; WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION:  POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS Ch. 5 (5th ed. 2009); REED DICKERSON, 
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975).  See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 
84 (1985) (reading text of statute requiring filing “prior to December 31” literally to rule invalid a filing 
made on December 31); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982) (reading text of statute 
literally to calculate penalty for failure to pay wages to seaman).  Regarding textualism and arbitration , 
see, e.g., Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (placing prominence on the text in 
construing §§ 9-11 of the Act, noting that the Act has textual features in conflict with enforcement of a 
contract to expand judicial review of arbitration results); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 
672 (2012) (“Had Congress meant to prohibit these very common provisions in the CROA, it would have 
done so in a manner less obtuse than what respondents suggest. When it has restricted the use of arbitration 
in other contexts, it has done so with a clarity that far exceeds the claimed indications in the CROA.”). 
37
 See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at 765-66; POPKIN, supra note 36, at ch. 5 (providing general 
overview of problems with overly textualist view and noting leavening doctrines such as the Whole Act 
Rule and canon against overly literal construction that give an absurd result); William Eskridge, Jr., The 
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legislative history and deferring to agency constructions of a statute)
38
 agree that the text 
of the law is the most important consideration and the place at which statutory 
construction must begin.
39
  Chief Justice Roberts (and Chief Justices William Rehnquist 
and Warren Burger before him) and the other Justices of the current Court all appear to 
agree on the importance of text, with Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito appearing 
closer to Justice Scalia’s more textual orientation.  Other Justices serving during the 
modern pro-arbitration era of the Court (Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and 
Souter) also reflected the legal profession’s general preference for the primacy of text in 
statutory construction, even if the primacy is at times a “soft” one for some Justices.  But 
overall, the Court as a whole historically has tended to operate in a pragmatic, largely 
centrist manner without undue emphasis on any particular method of statutory 
interpretation.
40
 
B. Legislative Intent 
 All members of the Court during the modern pro-arbitration era, except Justice 
Scalia, acknowledge that the drafting history and legislative intent of a statute are 
relevant to determining the meaning and application of a statute in particular contexts.
41
  
                                                 
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Nicholas Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism and the 
“New” New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L REV. 1597 (1992).  See also Jonathan Molot, The Rise and Fall 
of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2006); Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 33.  
38
 See Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History, supra note 7 (defending legitimacy of legislative 
intent as interpretative tool); see also ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at 955-56, 971-73 (noting 
acceptance of legislative background and other extrinsic information as tools of statutory construction);  
ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at 990 n. j (collecting substantial academic commentary supporting 
Justice Breyer’s attitude toward legislative history as mainstream view but also collecting scholarship 
reflecting substantial support for Scalia perspective); POPKIN, supra note 36, at chs. 2 - 5 (noting that for 
most of legal history legislative intent or purpose was seen as the touchstone of statutory construction and 
even more salient that statutory text but that text has attained more prominence in modern statutory 
construction theory).  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (codifying view that legislative intent “controls” 
judicial construction of stator meaning: “[t]he object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to 
ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.”). 
39
 See, e.g., U.S. v. Tinklenberg, 131 S. Ct. 2007, 2012 (2011); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance 
Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1331 (2011). 
40
 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 
(1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) [hereinafter Practical Reasoning].  
41
  See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 599 U.S. 120 (2000) (utilizing legislative 
history  in Justice O’Connor majority opinion; opinion joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas); Blanchard v. 
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989) (Justice White in majority opinion invokes legislative history); compare 
Kosak v. U.S., 465 U.S. 848 (1984) (utilizing legislative history in Justice Marshall’s opinion for the 
Court), with Kosak, 465 U.S. at 862-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (utilizing the textualist approach); see also  
Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (considering legislative background of statute and IRS 
regulation, including congressional failure to respond negatively to agency regulation); Leo Sheep Co. v. 
U.S., 440 U.S. 668 (1979) (relying heavily on legislative background and perceived intent and purpose of 
Congress that passed the Union Pacific Act of 1862).  See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal 
Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History:  Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 117, 122 (2008) (finding that both liberal and conservative justices make frequent resort to 
legislative history); Patricia Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (noting widespread acceptance of legislative 
10 
 
The Justices vary to the degree with which they will end their inquiry if the text appears 
to direct a result.  Some appear to see legislative history as inappropriate unless the 
statutory text is ambiguous while others appear willing to consult legislative history as a 
check on their reading of the text.  The Justices also frequently differ, of course, as to 
whether particular language is ambiguous.
42
 
C. Legislative Purpose 
 Legislative intent connotes a relatively specific intent of the legislature to achieve 
a particular result or that statutory language be applied in a rather specific way in a 
situation envisioned by the drafters.  Legislative purpose connotes more general goals of 
the statute.
43
  For example, where the legislative history reflects congressional consensus 
that particular legal precedents be overturned, this is a matter of legislative intent.  The 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
44
 for example, was designed specifically to overrule the 
Court’s 1976 General Electric v. Gilbert decision and deem pregnancy discrimination a 
violation of Title VII.
45
   
Where, by contrast, the legislative history reflects more general congressional 
desire to achieve certain results to prevent or discourage undesirable results, this is a 
matter of legislative purpose.  For example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995
46
 was designed to make it more difficult to bring securities violation lawsuits on 
the basis of hunch and therefore required more particularized pleadings.  But the statute 
did not specifically state whether the specified pleading standards found in case law 
applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) were adequate.
47
  Based on the legislative purpose of the 
law and its enactment notwithstanding the existence of Rule 9(b), a judge might view the 
                                                 
history as interpretative tool but contending that the Court has not been following “consistent and uniform 
rules of for statutory construction and use of legislative materials.”); but see ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 
32, at 987-90 (noting Justice Scalia’s opposition to use of legislative history).  
42
  See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (Court divides over whether statutory text 
empowers agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions); U.S. v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (Court divides 
over proper application of seemingly clear but odd filing deadline of “prior to December 31” contained in 
statute); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982) (Court divides over whether legislation 
setting statutory right of recovery has implicit end point or should be interpreted literally to allow damages 
to continue accruing). See also Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007) (Court 
relatively in agreement over meaning of text of statute but differing over whether literal application would 
produce absurd result and whether in such circumstances clear text may be disregarded).    
43
 See POPKIN, supra note 36, at § 6.02 (noting distinction between legislative intent as something 
specifically sought by enacting legislature and legislative purpose as more generalized goals of legislation).  
44
 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (2006). 
45
  In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Court found that pregnancy discrimination 
by an employer did not violate Title VII because – I am not making this up – only women get pregnant 
(some Court decisions are even worse than the current Court’s arbitration jurisprudence).  Congress reacted 
by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which made pregnancy discrimination an express violation 
of Title VII.  See AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009) (noting current statutory provision).  
46
 See 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2006) (codification of pleading standards of Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995). 
47
 See Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2001); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Marc. I. Steinberg & Diego E. Gomez-Cornejo, Blurring the Lines Between Pleading Doctrines:  The 
Enhanced Rule 8(a)(2) Plausibility Pleading Standard Converges with the Heightened Fraud Pleading 
Standards Under Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA, 30 REV. LITIG. 1, 16-25 (2010). 
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legislative purpose as requiring a more particularized pleading than found under the Rule 
in cases subject to the Act.  Conversely, a judge might find congressional silence on the 
issue an indication that Congress, despite its general concern over weak securities claims 
filed on a hunch, was simply wanting something more than mere notice pleading and 
wider application of cases taking a strong view of Rule 9(b).
48
   
Another example is provided by the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts,
49
 which 
were both designed to fight monopolization and to forbid contracts, combinations and 
conspiracies in restraint of trade – but Congress was relatively vague about how that 
should be done.  Although there is some legislative history suggesting that the laws were 
designed to prevent specific behemoths such as the Sugar Trust or the domination of the 
oil industry reflected by John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company (prior to its 
becoming Amoco, Esso, Enco, etc.), the statutes are in the main laws expressing general 
purposive guidelines.  As a result, the courts have tended to apply “rules of reason” rather 
than per se rules in many cases challenging alleged anti-competitive conduct.
50
  Judge 
Posner has characterized the Sherman Act as something of a common law statute, one 
that seems to invite judicial application because of the absence of specific directives in 
the law’s text or legislative history.
51
 
In its use of legislative purpose in construing the antitrust laws, the Court has used 
legislative purpose to trump the actual text of the law.  For example, if the Sherman Act 
were read literality and applied to “any” contract restraining trade,
52
 franchises and 
licenses would be forbidden because this is both the literal language of the statute and 
because all contracts by definition constrain the contracting parties to at least some 
degree in that as a result of the contract, they are obligated to perform or pay damages.
53
  
This view can also be considered akin to the “absurd result” canon of statutory 
                                                 
48
 Justice Stevens was perhaps the best known exponent of what is sometimes called the “dog didn’t 
bark” approach to statutory construction.  Under this view, congressional silence can be regarded as 
meaningful and frequently is invoked to suggest that a newly enacted statute was not designed to overturn 
an established practice touching on the area of statutory concern.  If Congress had wanted to make a 
change, it logically would have said so on the face of the statute or in the legislative history.  That Congress 
did not speak implies it intended no such change.  See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at 1035.  The 
metaphor is taken from the Sherlock Holmes story involving the theft of a prize racehorse at night from the 
stable in which the family dog did not bark despite this burglary.  Holmes correctly discerns that the thief 
must have been someone well-enough known to the dog such that the animal was not alarmed enough to 
bark.  See Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES (various editions and 
dates).  
49
 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 4 (2006). 
50
 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:  THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE § 6.4 (4th ed. 2011); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 39-40 (2d ed. 2011); JULIAN O. VON 
KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 8.01(2)(b) (2d ed. 1999). 
51
 See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 212 (1986) [hereinafter Legal Formalism]; Richard A. Posner, 
Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 818 (1983) 
[hereinafter Statutory Interpretation]. 
52
 The Sherman Act states that “any contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade” is 
illegal.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (emphasis added). 
53
 See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LAURENCE PONOROFF, MAKING AND DOING DEALS:  
CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT 711-13 (3d ed. 2011). 
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construction, a principle positing that statutory text will not be applied so literally as to 
render an absurd result.
54
 
D. The Hierarchy of Legislative History 
 Not all legislative history is created equal but jurists tend to agree on the relative 
authority and persuasiveness of different forms of legislative history.  In general, there is 
a preference, in roughly the following order for:  committee reports;
55
 statements by the 
chief authors of the legislation; constructions consistent with hearing testimony and 
congressional reaction; floor statements; and contemporary accounts of enactment of the 
legislation.
56
 
E. Canons of Construction 
 Canons of statutory construction are general rules for interpreting the laws and are 
derived from common understandings of drafting conventions, the legislative process, 
public policy, or jurisprudence.  Although varying in their affection for particular canons, 
all of the Justices appear to find them potentially useful in particular situations.
57
  Both 
textualists and others invoke canons of textual construction that provide presumptions as 
to the interpretation of words in a statute.
58
   Examples are the plain meaning rule
59
 and 
Latin maxims such as nocitur a sociis
60
 and ejusdem generis
61
 as well as preference for 
                                                 
54
 See U.S. v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992) (applying absurd result exception to general rule of 
applying “plain” textual meaning of statute); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-11 
(1989).    
55
 See Jorge Carro & Andrew Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories:  A 
Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 304 (1982) (over forty year period, more than 60 percent of 
Court’s citations to legislative history were to committee reports).  See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 
467 U.S. 69, 75,  n. 7 (1984) (relying on Senate report regarding civil rights bill that was not even enacted 
but was similar to that enacted in law). 
56
 See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at 971-1065; POPKIN, supra note 36, at chs. 6, 9-11.  See also 
OTTO HETZEL, MICHAEL LIBONATI & ROBERT WILLIAMS, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 589 (3d ed. 
2001) (providing extensive list of 20 different forms of legislative background information that courts may 
use). 
57
 This discussion of canons of construction is drawn largely from Appendix B to ESKRIDGE, ET AL., 
supra note 32, which presents an exhaustive review of the canons; see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 
6.   
58
 See  ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, app. B at 19-23 (providing examples of canons regarding 
presumptions as to word meaning); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6, at 69-239.  
59
 This requires adherence to the clear linguistic meaning of statutory text unless this would bring 
about an absurd result or there is evidence that the text is in error in departing from the specific intent of the 
legislature.  See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527-35 (2007); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 
20, 26-29 (2003); ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, app. B at 19.   
60
 This maxim provides that a general term is construed in a manner consistent with similar specific 
terms in a statute.  See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995); ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 
32, app. B at 20.    
61
 A general term is construed to reflect the class of objects shown in exemplary or specific terms used 
in the statute.  See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (discussed infra note 190-198 
and accompanying text; ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, app. B at 20).    
13 
 
ordinary meaning rather than technical or specialist meaning
62
 and use of dictionary 
definitions
63
 or resort to the default definitions of terms set forth in the Rules of 
Construction Act, 1 U.S.C. §1 if available.
64
  There are also a number of grammar and 
syntax canons regarding punctuation, grammar, the “rule of the last antecedent,” and the 
understanding largely shared with laypersons that “may” implies discretion while “shall” 
implies that something is mandatory or less discretionary while “or” means in the 
alternative and is disjunctive rather than conjunctive.
65
 
In addition, there are widely accepted canons regarding what might be termed the 
structural assessments of a statute.
66
  There is also widespread judicial agreement tending 
to embrace canons “expressing a preference for continuity in law.”
67
  Among these are a 
presumption of stare decisis but acceptance that wrongly decided precedents can be 
overruled where the case for change is sufficiently compelling.
68
  In addition, there is a 
presumption against repeals by implication
69
 and a presumption that statutory terms are 
used consistently across statutes.
70
  Related to this is the in pari materia rule providing 
that the use of similar statutory provisions in comparable statutes will be applied in the 
same way.
71
  There is also a judicial consensus that the views of a later Congress are 
generally not seen as illuminating the views of an enacting Congress.
72
 
 There are also a number of canons reflecting substantive policy generally 
embraced by the courts.  Despite the legal realist truth that judges can differ considerably 
in their personal preferences, the bench as a group appears to accept a basic core of 
substantive legal, political, and social values as well as adherence to governing 
procedural rules.  For example, a leading casebook divides these canons into several 
groups:  federalism canons, due process and common law based canons.
73
 
                                                 
62
 Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989); ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, 
app. B at 20.    
63
 Pittston Coal Grp. v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113 (1988); ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, app. B at 
20.  
64
 See Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481 (2005); ESKRIDGE, ET AL ., supra note 32, app. B at 
21.   
65
 Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005) (“may” implies discretion); 
Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 320 (2001); Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 302 (1989) (“shall” implies a 
command); Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1993) (rule of the last antecedent); 
ESKRIDGE, ET Al., supra note 32, app. B at 21.    
66
 See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at app. B. at 21; Stempel, Tainted Love, supra note 11, at 814-
15. 
67
 See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, app. B. at 25-26.   
68
 See id.   
69
 See id. at 26;  Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).   
70
 See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988); ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, app. B at 26.   
71
 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 640-43 (2007) (ironic in that, 
Ledbetter was legislatively overruled in 2009 because of a widespread perception that the Court’s holding 
was in error; the in pari materia canon, however, is widely followed by both liberals and conservatives, 
although they may of course differ in its application); ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, app. B at 26.   
72
 See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, app. B at 28.   
73
 See id. at 29-31.    
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F. More Controversial Approaches to Statutory Construction 
 The mainstream approach to statutory construction embraced by the Justices 
generally begins with and emphasizes text but also considers legislative intent and 
purpose to the degree appropriate so long as it does not strain the reading of the text.  The 
Court as a whole has been less willing or perhaps even unwilling to endorse some of the 
less established modes of statutory interpretation, which enjoy significant support in the 
academy.  Among these are considerations of public policy, appreciation of the interest 
group influence in legislation, and the view that construction of legislation should evolve 
with changing circumstances.
74
   In practice, however, it appears that courts use a variety 
of approaches that permit courts more ability to exercise personal preferences than courts 
are willing to acknowledge.
75
  In addition, there are questions of the role of the executive 
branch and administrative agencies in the construction of statutes.
76
   
 Quite controversial are dynamic or evolutionary approaches to statutory 
construction.  Under this approach, most associated with Professor William Eskridge,
77
 
reviewing courts are empowered to update legislation to fit current applications so long 
as sufficiently consistent with the language of the statute and the goals of the enacting 
legislature.  In other words, the court can modernize the statute to address unanticipated 
problems or results in the field at odds with the goals of the legislation.
78
   
For example, a dynamic statutory interpreter would approve of a decision such as 
Griggs v. Duke Power,
79
 in which the Burger Court concluded that job discrimination 
claims made pursuant the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could be proven, at least as a prima 
facie matter, even without evidence of intentional discrimination (“disparate treatment”) 
in cases where the defendant employer had a facially neutral policy that caused a racially 
                                                 
74
 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1997) (arguing that 
construction of statutes should evolve in manner consistent with purposes of enacting legislature to fit 
changes in society, economics, business); CALABRESI, supra note 2 (suggesting that older statutes should be 
treated like common law precedents that can, in compelling cases, be “overruled” by courts).  See also 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989) (public 
policy considerations frequently if tacitly used by courts in deciding cases; finding such use appropriate and 
legitimate but questioning particular values emphasized in certain decisions); Richard Stewart, The 
Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975) (noting rising interest group influence 
on modern legislation and administrative agency action but diffuse as to recommended reaction).  See 
generally ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at chs. 6-8 (reviewing approaches to statutory construction). 
75
 See Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 40.   
76
 See Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989). 
77
 See William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987); see 
also William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621 (1990); William N. Eskridge, All 
About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Forward: Law as Equilibrium, 
108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994) (arguing for inclusion of dynamic perspective as component of more 
pragmatic, mainstream approaches to statutory construction). 
78
 See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 74; ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra 
note 32, at 749; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 21 
(1988) (arguing for dynamic statutory construction but labeling it as a “nautical” model in which the 
legislature sets the statute on a voyage that must be completed by courts construing the law). 
79
 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1972). 
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“disparate impact.”
80
   The Court was in effect updating the statute (a mere eight years 
after its passage) to account for the difficulty of proving discrimination once employers 
were on notice that announced intentional discrimination violated the law. 
Similarly, in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,
81
 the Court took a 
dynamic approach in concluding that affirmative action policies favoring minority 
workers did not violate the nondiscrimination principle of Title VII through reverse-
discrimination.
82
  The statute, which had been passed 15 years earlier, was largely silent 
on the issue.  The Court in essence reasoned that effective implication of the law would 
under some circumstances require remedial relief that included affirmative action 
efforts.
83
 
More controversial than dynamic statutory interpretation is the view that older 
statutes should be treated akin to common law in that a modern court can feel empowered 
to apply a construction of the statute that fits the current legal landscape even if this is far 
afield from the literal text of the law or the enacting legislature’s specific intent or 
general purpose.   This approach is most associated with Guido Calabresi’s A Common 
Law for the Age of Statutes, in which then-Professor Calabresi defended the view
84
 well 
enough that the book received the American Association of Law Schools triennial Coif 
Award.
85
  Nonetheless, the book and the school of thought became a lightning rod for 
critics contending that the common law approach to statutory construction was 
insufficiently appreciative of the limits of judicial power and the American approach to 
separation of powers.
86
 
Evolutionary approaches to statutory construction such as dynamic statutory 
interpretation or a common law approach are seldom directly addressed in judicial 
opinions and are, at least in official parlance, not mainstream schools of statutory 
construction.  In practice, however, courts may use them sub silentio to aid in reaching a 
decision where the resolution of the issue is not dictated by statutory text, specific 
legislative intent, or clearly discernable legislative purpose whose application to the 
instant case is fairly clear. 
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Because of the outsider status of dynamic/common law statutory construction, it 
is more than a bit surprising to see it applied to questions of arbitrability by three 
successive courts (the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts) generally regarded as 
conservative.  Their predecessor, the Warren Court, generally regarded as one of the most 
liberal in American history, tended toward an originalist view that was sometimes wary 
of arbitration and hesitant to construe the Federal Arbitration Act in a manner that would 
open up wide areas of dispute to mass arbitration.
87
  But, as discussed below, the Court 
since the 1980s has been engaged in a dynamic interpretative enterprise that has 
expanded the scope of the Act substantially beyond what was originally intended. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND ARBITRATION:  PROMOTION BUT INCONSISTENCY 
A. Pre-Act History  
 The Court (and courts generally) were not always proponents of arbitration.  
Indeed, the Act was prompted in large part by the business community’s dismay over 
such decisions and its persuasion of Congress that legislative overruling of anti-
arbitration decisions was in order.
88
  A personal favorite illustration of pre-Act judicial 
hostility to arbitration is Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten v. Aktieselskabet Korn-Og 
Foderstof Kompagniet, (often also known at The Atlanten or Korn-Og, the latter my 
preference).
89
  In this case decided shortly before enactment of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, the Court, (affirming a Learned Hand trial court decision and a Second Circuit 
decision) held that even what appears to be a broadly worded arbitration clause in a 
shipping contract between merchants (with no discernable issues of consumer protection, 
consent, etc.) does not require arbitration.
90
  The reason:  because one party sought to 
arbitrate an issue of breach of contract, the arbitration clause was inapplicable because 
the claim did not arise out of the performance of the contract because the contract was not 
being performed due to the breach.
91
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B. The Federal Arbitration Act 
 Cases like Korn-Og were not that unusual.  English courts resisted specific 
enforcement of arbitration clauses on the ground that these improperly ousted courts of 
their rightful jurisdiction, a view that was largely adopted in the United States.  In 
reaction, the commercial community sought corrective legislation and obtained it with 
passage of the Act, now codified at 9 U.S.C. §§1-16.
92
    
 The Act itself, passed in 1925 with an effective date of January 1, 1926 (9 U.S.C. 
§14), is rather short and straight-forward.  After defining key terms such as “commerce” 
and “maritime,” the Act states: 
 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to 
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to 
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, 
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.
93
 
 
 Section 3 of the statute (9 U.S.C. §3) provides that courts may issue a stay of 
judicial proceedings in order to permit arbitration to proceed pursuant to an enforceable 
agreement.  Section 4 (9 U.S.C. §4) gives federal courts authority to enter an order 
compelling arbitration if the petitioning party to a valid arbitration agreement is 
“aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate.”  Several 
sections of the Act deal with procedural matters.  See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §5 (governing the 
appointment of arbitrators); 9 U.S.C. §6 (providing that applications for relief are treated 
as motions; 9 U.S.C. §7 (governing witnesses, fees, and subpoenas); 9 U.S.C. §8 
(governing admiralty matters such as seizure of vessels); 9 U.S.C. §11 (regulating 
modification and correction of errors in an arbitration award); 9 U.S.C. §13 (governing 
papers and docketing); and 9 U.S.C. §15 (inapplicability of the “Act of State” doctrine). 
The Act provides strong support for enforcing arbitration awards, specifying that 
federal courts may confirm awards and enter judgment based on the award (9 U.S.C. §9), 
which in turn gives the prevailing arbitration party the normal range of judgment 
collection tools under applicable procedural law.  Section 10 of the Act (9 U.S.C. §10) 
permits arbitration awards to be challenged, but on grounds considerably narrower than 
those available in litigation, specifically: 
 
• where the award was “procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means”; 
 
                                                 
92
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common law resistant to arbitration and gestation and passage of Act). 
93
 9 U.S.C. §2 (2006). 
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• where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or 
either of them; 
 
• where the arbitrators erred by refusing to delay a hearing for good cause 
or to hear “pertinent and material evidence” or where there was “any other 
misbehavior” prejudicing the rights of the parties; or 
 
• where the arbitrators exceeded the scope of their power in light of the 
matter submitted to them or “so imperfectly” executed their power “that a 
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was 
not made;”
94
 
 
The final section of the Act (9 U.S.C. §16) governs appeals and reflects 
congressional preference (largely through 1990 amendments rather than the original 1925 
enactment) to reduce appellate challenge to pro-arbitration orders
95
 but permit appellate 
review of orders refusing to compel arbitration or refusing to stay judicial proceedings 
pending arbitration. 
C. The First Five Decades of Construing the Arbitration Act 
Despite passage of the Act, there remained some judicial resistance to arbitration, 
as occasionally reflected in case law over the next 50 years.  Most prominent was Wilko 
v. Swan,
96
 which held – seemingly out of the blue – that claims arising under the 
Securities Act of 1933 were not subject to arbitration, regardless of the clarity of the 
arbitration clause, the knowing and voluntary consent of the parties, the standard practice 
of the industry, or the expectations of the parties.   
In a similar vein was Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,
97
 which the Court 
implicitly revisited and reversed in the watershed Southland Corp. v. Keating
98
 decision.  
The Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act was procedural rather than substantive 
and consequently was subject to the Erie doctrine, which made Vermont law applicable 
in the instant case.  Under Vermont law, arbitration agreements of this type were 
unenforceable.  Hence, arbitration was not required regardless of the surrounding 
contracting circumstances.
99
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 The Court took a more receptive approach to arbitration in the context of labor 
arbitration in the “Steelworkers Trilogy,” three cases involving disputes between the then 
powerful United Steelworkers of America union and companies with which it had 
collective bargaining agreements providing for arbitration of workplace disputes.
100
  
Some argue that these cases – rather than the Court’s 1980s cases promoting arbitration –  
comprise the inauguration of the modern era of Supreme Court precedent favoring 
arbitration.
101
  In American Mfg. and Warrior & Gulf, the Court enforced arbitration 
agreements.
102
  In Enterprise Wheel & Car, the Court announced a very deferential 
standard for the review of labor arbitration decisions, holding that the decision would be 
confirmed by courts so long as the arbitrator’s decision “drew its essence” from the 
agreement.
103
  A cynic might note that even a horribly erroneous decision can still be one 
dealing with the essence or core of the agreement giving rise to the dispute. 
 Because these three cases were so focused on labor arbitration rather than 
commercial or consumer arbitration, I consider them to be precursors to the modern era.  
To be sure, the Court is showing signs of greater affection for arbitration but this results 
largely from the Court’s view that arbitration is a particularly critical component of the 
collective bargaining process and an established means by which labor peace is 
preserved.  As the Court’s other 1960s and 1970s cases show, the Court was warming to 
arbitration but continued to have doubts about it outside the labor arena.   
In Moseley v. Electronic Missile Facilities, Inc.,
104
 a plumbing/heating 
subcontractor filed suit in Georgia to collect funds allegedly owed to it by the general 
contractor for a United States government missile site and successfully resisted 
arbitration even though the contractor had previously filed an action in New York 
seeking to enforce the arbitration clause.  The Court found that the subcontractor had 
adequately alleged an issue regarding possible fraud regarding the procurement of the 
arbitration agreement.
105
  This seems a relatively classic case of what I have termed “old” 
or traditional commercial arbitration rather than the “new” or “mass” arbitration of retail 
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consumer matters that has troubled many.
106
 However, one might argue that the terms of 
the arbitration agreement unfairly subjected the subcontractor to a seriously inconvenient 
forum.
107
   Notwithstanding the Steelworkers Trilogy, Moseley suggested continuing 
wariness toward arbitration by the court. 
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
108
 the Court held (arguably 
overruling Moseley) that a question of fraudulent inducement into the contract containing 
an arbitration clause was in first instance a question for the arbitrator.  By giving 
arbitrators “first dibs” on these questions, the Court appeared to move toward a more 
favorable attitude toward arbitration.
109
  Continuing this substantial deference to private 
dispute resolution agreements, the Court in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
110
 
enforced a forum selection clause in a maritime towing agreement, even though the party 
adhering to the towing contract had relatively little bargaining power in light of the 
disabled condition of its vessel.
111
  The case was regarded as a sign that the Court was 
beginning to look more favorably on such agreements.
112
   Logically, this suggested 
similarly more favorable attitudes toward arbitration agreements.  But The Bremen was a 
case of traditional commercial arbitration rather than of new mass arbitration affecting 
consumers. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware,
113
 involved a dispute over 
wage claims.  The Court refused to enforce the standard arbitration clause signed by 
workers in the financial services industry as a condition of their employment because of a 
state law prohibiting arbitration of wage claims.  Although this decision is now 
effectively overruled by Southland and its progeny
114
 the latter cases are arguably 
distinguishable in that the state law in Ware appears more directly aimed against 
arbitration while the state law in Southland was made inapplicable to any contract 
provisions waiving substantive rights as a condition of obtaining a franchise.  However, 
in view of the Court’s most recent arbitration decision in AT&T v. Concepcion, which 
refused to apply state contract law to arbitration agreements despite the language of the 
Federal Arbitration Act inviting its application,
115
 Ware is effectively dead (absent a 
change in Court composition and a willingness to re-examine the issue) and represents 
the Court’s old skeptical concern about arbitration rather than its newfound affection for 
arbitration.
116
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 A year after Ware, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
117
 the Court enforced an 
arbitration clause – one calling for arbitration in France – contained in a sale-of-business 
agreement between a businessperson and a large multinational company.  Although 
traveling to Paris is hardly the greatest dispute resolution burden one might face, the 
Court’s enforcement reflects its general comfort with arbitration, at least in the 
commercial context.  But, as in The Bremen, the Court was dealing with old style 
commercial arbitration and not the new mass arbitration of consumer complaints that 
would arise as a consequence of the Court’s later pro-arbitration jurisprudence.  Even so, 
scholarly discussion of the decision expressed concern that the franchisee dealing with 
the manufacturer might lack sufficient independence, savvy, and bargaining power as 
well as expressing concern that the language and reasoning of Scherk could lead to more 
aggressive enforcement of arbitration clauses contained on consumer contracts.
118
 
 As of the mid-1970s, then, the Court’s approach could be characterized as one of 
greater acceptance of arbitration but with some continuing concern or even outright 
hostility when arbitration clauses swept within their textual ambit statutory claims.  For 
example, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
119
 the Title VII claim of a union 
employee was held to be beyond the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the 
collective bargaining agreement to which he was subject.  Although the decision can be 
fairly regarded as one merely interpreting the scope of the arbitration clause and the 
nature of union-management dispute resolution as opposed to a civil rights claim, the 
decision can also be read as one applying a statutory or public policy exception to the 
Federal Arbitration Act.
120
   In any event, Gardner-Denver suggested that the Court 
remained at least mildly skeptical about arbitration in some contexts. 
 For example, in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,
121
 the Court 
held that a broadly worked arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement did not 
apply to the worker’s Fair Labor Standards Act Claims.  The case stands pretty clearly as 
a case applying a “statutory” claims exception to arbitration in the manner of Wilko v. 
Swan.  The Court, although not overtly hostile to arbitration, continued to limit its reach 
and deny arbitrability for certain types of cases.
122
  In McDonald v. City of West 
Branch,
123
 in a fashion quite similar to Barrentine, the Court refused to compel 
arbitration of civil rights claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, suggesting that the 
Court is not yet in full embrace of arbitration as a concept.
124
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But within a short time after McDonald v. West Branch, the Court’s affection for 
arbitration solidified.  Despite 1980s cases such as Barrentine and West Branch that 
reflected continued wariness about arbitration, the Court by the mid-1980s had embarked 
on a new path.  Decided during the same term as West Branch, Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp.,
125
 enforced an arbitration agreement in a dispute 
over a construction project between the buyer hospital and the general contractor.  The 
hospital sought a state court order staying arbitration proceedings notwithstanding that 
the construction contract, like most such contracts, contained a broadly worded 
arbitration clause committing such  contract-related disputes to arbitration.   
The Court’s decision compelling arbitration and rejecting the view that “Colorado 
River” abstention
126
 by the federal court was required by notions of deference to ongoing 
state proceedings
127
 made eminent sense.  In dissent, however, Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor argued that in its zeal to render the pro-arbitration 
ruling, the majority had been too quick to find a sufficiently final order that permitted 
appeal.
128
 Legal realists might also note with some irony that in Moses H. Cone, it was 
three of the Court’s Republican-appointed conservatives who had misgivings about the 
pro-arbitration result – exactly the opposite of the situation tending to obtain in the 
current Court.  
 What prompts some to see Moses H. Cone as the dawn of the modern pro-
arbitration era is its rhetoric favoring arbitration.
129
  More substantively, the Moses H. 
Cone majority states that the Act “create[s] a substantive law of arbitrability applicable to 
any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.”
130
  In other words, the Act 
would appear to apply in state courts as well as in federal court.  But this issue was not 
prominently addressed until the Court’s next important arbitration case.  Although the 
Moses H. Cone decision favored arbitration, it was not the full-fledged embrace that 
came in Southland Corp. v. Keating,
131
 which most regard as the dawn of the Court’s 
modern pro-arbitration jurisprudence.  
 Southland involved a dispute between the convenience store chain 7-Eleven and a 
California franchisee.  The franchise agreement contained a broadly worded arbitration 
clause the franchisor sought to enforce to compel arbitration of the dispute.  The 
franchisee resisted, citing as support a portion of the state’s franchise law that forbade 
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enforcement of waivers of franchisee rights.  The California Supreme Court reasoned that 
an arbitration clause was in effect a waiver of the franchisee’s right to seek judicial relief 
in the event of a controversy over the franchise agreement.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed.
132
   
 Southland thus presented in starker relief than Moses H. Cone the issue of 
whether the Federal Arbitration Act was substantive federal law that took precedence 
over contrary state law.  The Supreme Court could not alter the construction of a state 
statute declared by the state’s highest court, even if it found the reasoning (that agreement 
to arbitration was a sufficient waiver of substantive rights to be forbidden under state 
franchise law) flawed.  If the decision was to be reversed, it had to be because the state 
law was powerless against a federal law commanding arbitration – and the Southland 
Court so found, over the dissents of Justice Stevens
133
 and Justice O’Connor (joined by 
Justice Rehnquist).
134
   
Southland, authored by Chief Justice Burger, who had been promoting alternative 
dispute resolution from the bully pulpit of the Chief’s office, also appears to mark the 
beginning of an ideological shift in that Republican and conservative Justices that might 
otherwise have opposed broad arbitration clause enforcement on federalism and states’ 
rights grounds began to become arbitration advocates notwithstanding the powerful pull 
these concepts normally exert over Republicans and conservatives.  Justice Rehnquist 
would soon be largely supporting outcomes favorable to arbitration.  Although Justice 
O’Conner continued to express opposition to the nationalization of the Federal 
Arbitration Act by making it substantive law and was later joined by Justice Thomas, 
there are today no Republican-appointed Justices opposing arbitrability in close cases.
135
 
 The Southland majority embraced the now-modern view of the Act as federal 
substantive law, bootstrapping in part on the passing statement to that effect in Justice 
Brennan’s Moses H. Cone opinion.
136
  Although acknowledging that “the legislative 
history [of the Act] is not without ambiguities,” the Court found that “there are strong 
indications that Congress had in mind something more than making arbitration 
agreements enforceable only in the federal courts.”
137
  The Court further found that “[i]n 
creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended 
to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements.”
138
  Thus, the Court held “that § 31512 of the California Franchise 
Investment Law violated the Supremacy Clause” as well as being inconsistent with the 
Federal Arbitration Act.
139
   
 Rightly or wrongly, Southland is an example of dynamic or evolutionary statutory 
construction in that the majority is expanding the reach of the statute beyond the specific 
intent of the enacting Congress and perhaps beyond the basic purpose of the statute as 
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well, although the Southland result can be defended in part on broad legislative grounds 
(i.e., general congressional support for arbitration).  But in its sub silentio dynamism, the 
Southland majority arguably overreads the text of the Act and clearly minimizes or even 
ignores traditional mainstream concerns of federalism, historical practice, restraint in 
expanding congressional power absent a clear statement, and deference to traditional state 
prerogatives. 
 Although the majority has a plausible textual construction of the Act, it can also 
be argued that the Act’s language stating that arbitration agreements may be avoided on 
“grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” (9 U.S.C. §2) 
includes illegality under applicable state law such as the California Franchise Investment 
Act.  Although it would not be well articulated for another decade or so, a natural reading 
of this language also clearly encompasses state contract law concepts such as fraud, 
misrepresentation, and unconscionability (both procedural and substantive) that can 
support setting aside contract terms such as arbitration clauses if they are deemed 
sufficiently oppressive. 
The majority also has a plausible view of the legislative history.  But Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent is much more thorough in its exploration of legislative history and 
quite convincing in its argument that the Act was always intended by Congress only to 
apply to federal court proceedings, which were at the time the proceedings about which 
the commercial proponents of the Act were concerned.
140
  In an important illumination of 
the result-orientation of the Southland majority, the O’Connor dissent notes that 
Southland is effectively overruling Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.,
141
 which had viewed 
the Federal Arbitration Act as procedural and thus applied Erie v. Tompkins,
142
 to require 
that the validity and enforceability of an arbitration clause litigated in Vermont state court 
be decided by Vermont law.   But the Southland majority does not even cite Bernhardt, 
let alone address it and explain why its reasoning some 30 years ago (and much closer to 
the time the Act was passed) is in error. 
This failing suggests the Southland majority may have been excessively intent on 
expanding the Act and embracing arbitration on personal preference grounds rather than 
giving the issue the careful reading of precedent it deserved.  Even if one agrees with the 
Southland majority that the time had come to consider the Federal Arbitration Act as 
substantive federal law applicable in state court, the Bernhardt/Erie question at least 
needed to be addressed.  Instead, the Southland majority dodged the issue – another 
indication of the Court’s rush to embrace arbitration notwithstanding the normal rules of 
adjudication in the face of contrary precedent. 
Both the O’Connor dissent and the Stevens concurrence/dissent in Southland also 
make a strong case that the majority’s application of the Act is inconsistent with the 
federalism and states’ rights concerns that not only constantly animate American law but 
also appear to have been on the mind of the enacting Congress.  Justice Stevens, in 
addition to noting Justice O’Connor’s compelling review of the legislative history of the 
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Act, focuses on the importance of states’ rights and federalism as a strong background 
norm of statutory interpretation.
143
   
The Stevens dissent, like much of his judicial work, makes its insights concisely 
but powerfully and stakes out a moderate position consistent with his overall approach to 
law.
144
  He respects the text of the statute but does not read it woodenly or hyper-literally.  
Instead, he reads the text with a healthy reverence for the legislative history of the law 
that may shed light on specific legislative intent.  He is mindful of the purpose of the 
statute and practical realities of modern commerce and regulation.  He respects state 
prerogatives in an area of traditional state autonomy and the federalist model of 
American government and law.   He is willing to read the Act as laying down substantive 
law applicable in state as well as federal court but gives breathing space to state contract 
law and regulation.   He appreciates that the California franchise law is not an anti-
arbitration law but a franchisee protection law, which arguably takes it out of the broad 
reach of 9 U.S.C. 2’s authority to compel arbitration and puts it into the savings clause of 
this portion of the Act. 
Justices Stevens also correctly recognizes, in light of Justice O’Connor’s strong 
arguments based on legislative history, that the Southland majority is engaging in what 
might be termed “dynamic” or “evolutive” statutory construction by adapting the 1925 
legislation to 1984 commercial reality.  “Although Justice O’Connor’s review of the 
legislative history . . . demonstrates that the 1925 Congress that enacted the statute 
viewed the statute as essentially procedural in nature, I am persuaded that the intervening 
developments in the law compel the conclusion that the Court has reached” as to the Act 
being substantive law, even if not as to the applicability of the California Franchise 
Investment Act.
145
   
Joining the Southland majority opinion were Justices William Brennan, Byron 
White, Harry Blackmun, and Lewis Powell.
146
  With the exception of Justice Brennan, 
who espoused support for a “living Constitution” that was interpreted consistent with 
changes in American society and who tended to favor federal authority over state 
authority in many cases,
147
 these Justices were traditionalists who eschewed dynamism 
for original legislative intent and federalism over unitary control by a central 
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government.
148
  But here they are embracing in Southland a result seemingly at odds with 
their professed jurisprudential philosophies.   
In Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd,
149
 decided the year after Southland, the Court 
continued in a pro-arbitration vein.  The issue was whether a customer’s mixture of 
federal securities claims (not arbitrable because of Wilko v. Swan)
150
 and state law claims 
(clearly arbitrable under the Act if sued on alone) prevented arbitration of the state claims 
because they were intertwined with the non-arbitrable federal claim.  Resolving a split in 
the circuits, the Court rejected the intertwinement doctrine that had required all claims to 
go to litigation in some circuits, holding that arbitration of the state law claims could be 
compelled and need not await resolution of the securities claims.  The Dean Witter 
Reynolds v. Byrd decision was unanimous, a reflection of its reasonableness under the 
circumstances (by a Court for the moment saddled with the Wilko precedent that was 
steadily falling out of fashion).   
 Concurring separately, Justice White (a member of the Moses H. Cone and 
Southland majorities and a consistent supporter of arbitration during his time on the 
Court) criticized Wilko and noted that its holding involved only claims under the 
Securities Act of 1933 and that too many courts and commentators had assumed the same 
reasoning applied to claims brought pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
Justice White argued that there were sufficient differences between the laws such that 
Wilko’s restriction on arbitration should be confined strictly to 1933 Act claims.
151
  
Although Justice White’s attempt to differentiate the statutes is not particularly 
persuasive, it is an important small step on the way to overruling Wilko (and its shaking 
1933 Act reasoning based on the then-Court majority’s personal public policy 
preferences) and removing this and other statutory restrictions on arbitration.   
 In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
152
 the Court again 
supported arbitration, dealing an implicit blow to cases like Wilko, Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver, Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best, and McDonald v. West Branch that had restricted 
arbitration for statutory claims.
153
  The Court found no legal barrier to requiring 
arbitration of antitrust claims raised by an automobile retailer in its dispute with the 
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manufacturer.  The contract between the retailer and the manufacturer, as might be 
expected in this commercial setting, contained a broadly worded arbitration clause. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Harry Blackmun found no basis in statutory text, 
legislative intent or purpose, or public policy concerns for cutting back the scope of the 
arbitration agreement merely because one of the bases of dispute involved a federal 
statute.  In reaching this result, the Court sounded more loudly the death knell of Wilko 
and similar cases that opposed arbitration of certain claims based on public policy 
grounds.  “We find no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in every contract 
within its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory claims,” wrote Justice 
Blackmun.
154
  The majority opinion reiterated much of the pro-arbitration rhetoric of 
Moses H. Cone, Southland, and Prima Paint about the strong federal policy favoring 
arbitration.
155
   
Two terms later, the Court advanced the cause of arbitrability and sounded the 
death knell of Wilko v. Swan in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon.
156
 Picking up 
on Justice White’s concurrence in Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd,
157
 the Court refused to 
extend the securities law statutory exception of Wilko v. Swan to claims made pursuant to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.   Although the 1933 Act exception of Wilko was not 
dead yet, it was living on borrowed time in that the rationale for refusing a statutory 
claim exception in McMahon is equally applicable and powerful as regards 1933 Act 
claims that were at issue in Wilko.
158
 The McMahon Court also rejected the argument that 
claims made pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 
were exempt from arbitration, a view shared by the entire Court, that also runs counter 
the notion of the existence of a statutory claims or public policy exception to 
arbitrability.
159
  
 McMahon is thus an important pro-arbitration opinion in the sense that it limits 
and sets the stage for further curtailment of the statutory claims exception to abitrability.  
Justice Blackmun (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall) dissented, arguing that the 
1934 Act was sufficiently similar to the 1933 Act that the McMahon claim should enjoy 
the protection against arbitrability provided by Wilko v. Swan.
160
 Although on the losing 
side of this significant battle, the dissenters fought hard against the constriction and 
foreshadowed demise of Wilko.   
The same year, in Perry v. Thomas,
161
 the Court struck another blow for 
arbitration.  In a Justice Thurgood Marshall opinion, it compelled arbitration of a wage 
claim in the face of a state law exempting wage claims from arbitration.  In effect, Merrill 
Lynch v. Ware,
162
 was overruled while Southland v. Keating,
163
 was affirmed, shoring up 
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the strength of the modern, pro-arbitration working majority of the Court four years after 
the watershed Southland decision.  Perry v. Thomas continued the Court’s embrace of 
arbitration on the rhetorical level as well and makes substantial citation of the Court’s 
more recent cases with pro-arbitration outcomes.
164
  The message to even the casual 
reader is pretty clear.  Arbitration is generally strongly supported by the Court, even in 
the face of contrary state law.   
 Perry v. Thomas is generally susceptible to the same bases of praise or scorn one 
might heap on Southland.  The majority (Justices Marshall, Burger, Blackmun, Brennan, 
and White) is a group purporting to embrace mainstream jurisprudence but arguably 
neglecting to consider core mainstream judicial concerns of federalism, state prerogatives 
of contract regulation, legislative intent and purpose, and reading the Federal Arbitration 
Act’s text too broadly.  But Perry may perhaps be better defended than Southland in that 
the California Labor Code § 229 appears more directly aimed at arbitration (and thus in 
conflict with the now-deemed-substantive federal law) while the California Franchise 
Investment Act was a broader prohibition against waivers of all types, not solely 
arbitration clauses.
165
  Only Justices Stevens and O’Connor dissented, each in separate 
opinions.  Justice O’Connor reiterated her view that the enacting Congress did not intend 
for the Federal Arbitration Act to create substantive federal law applicable to state 
proceedings and echoed the Stevens view from Southland that the Act’s own language 
permits refusal to order arbitration if there were other bases under state law preventing 
enforcement of the contract.
166
   
Justice Stevens made a similar argument of legislative intent and purpose and 
defended an originalist notion of statutory interpretation even though his Southland 
dissent had been relatively dynamic or evolutive in its approach to the statute.
167
  
Whatever the merits of the pro- and anti-arbitration perspectives clashing in Perry v. 
Thomas, it seemed odd that the Court majority did so little to defend its position against 
the contention that the majority had been unfaithful to the legislative intent and purpose 
of the law, as well as, the rights of the sovereign states to regulate contractual 
undertakings.  In essence, the Perry majority is resting on the analysis of Southland, 
which makes Perry a similarly dynamic approach to construing the Act.   
 In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
168
 the Court 
completed the process begun in Byrd and McMahon and formally overruled Wilko v. 
Swan.  The Court had now eliminated the rationale for a statutory claims exception to 
arbitration as well as making 1933 Act claims subject to arbitration.  Although the abitral 
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exceptions for Title VII, FLSA, and Section 1983 claims in prior case law were not 
overturned, they appeared in jeopardy.   
But in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane,
169
 the Court reaffirmed its apparently 
continuing commitment to these public policy exceptions to arbitrability by 
distinguishing the earlier statutory cases from Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) claims, for which the Court found no such exception.
170
  Notwithstanding its 
arguable support for exceptions from arbitration for Title VII, FLSA and Section 1983 
claims, the Court’s support for arbitration is dramatically on display in Gilmer.  The case 
involved a securities industry employee making an ADEA claim against the brokerage 
house that fired him at age 62.  The Gilmer majority, in an opinion by Justice White, 
treats the case as simply one of whether a statutory exception exists for ADEA claims 
and determines the answer is “no,” as per Rodriguez, McMahon, and Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth.    
The Court gave only the figurative back of its hand (in part because the issue was 
raised late in the proceedings by Gilmer’s amici but not by Gilmer himself below)
171
 to a 
much stronger argument contending that the Act itself in its clear text states that 
arbitration clauses in employment contracts are not enforceable, at least for workers 
engaged in interstate commerce.  Section 1 of the Act states that “nothing herein 
contained [in the Act] shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”
172
   
Rather than simply refusing to consider the § 1 argument because of waiver, the 
Gilmer majority used a bit of linguistic sleight of hand to avoid the issue by viewing the 
securities industry form signed by Gilmer as something other than a “contract of 
employment.”
173
  The Gilmer majority begs the question of how an arbitration clause can 
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meaning of the words of Section 1 in that securities brokers, dealers, agents, sales and servicing employees 
most certainly are as a group engaged in interstate commerce because of the nature of financial markets and 
the common use of wire, mail, and telephone communications as part of their activities. 
173
  See 500 U.S. at 24, n. 2:  
 
In any event, it would be inappropriate to address the scope of the § 1 exclusion because 
the arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract of employment.  
The FAA requires that the arbitration clause being enforced be in writing. . . . The record 
before us does not show, and the parties do not contend, that Gilmer’s employment 
agreement with Interstate contained a written arbitration clause.  Rather, the arbitration 
clause at issue is in Gilmer’s securities registration application, which is a contract with 
the securities exchanges, not with Interstate.  The lower courts that the exclusionary 
clause in §1 of the FAA is inapplicable to arbitration clauses contained in such 
registration applications.  . . . Unlike the dissent, we chose to follow the plain language of 
the FAA and the weight of authority, and we therefore hold that §1’s exclusionary clause 
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be sufficiently subject to the Act to be enforceable by the employer if it is not contained 
in a contract between them.  The success of the securities industry in requiring that all its 
licensed brokers sign arbitration agreements would logically make out a stronger case for 
extending § 1 protections to those workers, who clearly must agree as a condition of 
employment and where it appears that there is no reasonable alternative for the 
prospective employee other than submitting to the arbitration clause.  Instead, the Gilmer 
Court defined the problem away through a legal fiction of sorts. 
 In his dissent, Justice Stevens, who raised troubling objections to the Court’s 
embrace of arbitration rather than federalism or legislative history in Southland, offers a 
rather devastating rebuttal.  He points out that the Court on many occasions has not 
strictly enforced the concept of waiver in order to render a full assessment of a case 
before it.
174
  He then notes that narrowness of the Court’s concept of what constitutes a 
“contract of employment.”
175
  On the issue of the meaning of § 1, Justice Stevens 
marshals equally compelling evidence of legislative intent and purpose to protect workers 
from unwanted arbitration agreements that could not realistically be avoided because of 
the vulnerability of workers seeking work.
176
  Although the discussion during the 
legislative history focused on workers who were constantly and visibly involved in 
physical movement across state lines, this was a mere consequence of the involvement 
during the legislative process of the leadership of the Seaman’s Union, which 
                                                 
does not apply to Gilmer’s arbitration agreement.  Consequently, we leave for another 
day the issue raised by amici curiae (citations omitted). 
 
“Another day” came a decade later when the Court decided Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 
105 (2001) (discussed infra notes 190-198), holding that even where the arbitration agreement was in a 
direct contract between employer and employee asserting a Title VII claim, §1 was inapplicable because 
the employee, a retail electronics salesperson and manager, was not part of a class of workers engaged in 
interstate commerce, id. at 115. 
174
 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 37.   
175
 Id. at 40: 
 
Given that the FAA specifically was intended to exclude arbitration agreements between 
employees and employers, I see no reason to limit this exclusion from coverage to 
arbitration clauses contained in agreements entitled “Contract of Employment.”  In this 
case, the parties conceded at oral argument that Gilmer had no “contact of employment as 
such with respondent.  Gilmer was, however, required as a condition of his employment 
to become a registered representative of several stock exchanges, including the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE)  Just because his agreement to arbitrate any dispute, claim 
or controversy” with his employer that arose out of the employment relationship was 
contained in his application for registration before the NYSE rather than a specific 
contract of employment with his employer, I do not think that Gilmer can be compelled 
pursuant to the FAA to arbitrate his employment-related dispute.  Rather, in my opinion 
the exclusion in §1 should be interpreted to cover any agreements by the employee to 
arbitrate disputes with the employer arising out of the employment relationship, 
particularly where such agreements to arbitrate are conditions of employment.   
 
The Stevens dissent then marshals history and precedent supporting a broad reading of the term contract of 
employment.   
176
 Id. 
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understandably used seaman as their paradigmatic example of workers who should not be 
unfairly saddled with nonconsensual arbitration agreements.
177
   
 Although the discussion of the employment exception in Gilmer is necessarily 
truncated, it foreshadows the Court’s ultimate unfortunately crabbed reading of §1 in 
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.
178
  In taking a narrow view of § 1, the Court 
downplayed the text of the Federal Arbitration Act, congressional intent, statutory 
purpose, and the federalism concerns of the states in protecting workers from potentially 
unfair tribunals that might be imposed upon the workers without their consent due to the 
great leverage held by employers. 
 There is of course a jurisprudential inconsistency of the Court’s broad and 
aggressive (and dynamic and evolutive as well) reading of §§ 2, 3, and 4 of the Act 
regarding the enforceability of arbitration coupled with the Court’s very narrow reading 
of § 1 of the Act protecting employees from compelled arbitration.  Logically, § 1 should 
receive the same interpretative treatment as does § 2.  Given the legislative intent and 
statutory purpose of enforcing commercial arbitration agreements between merchants and 
halting judicial reluctance to specifically enforce clearly consensual arbitration clauses, 
there is nothing inconsistent with a pro-arbitration view of the Act that also recognizes 
that the Act does not extend its support of arbitration into the employment context. 
 Despite the tangential treatment of § 1 in Gilmer, the decision (with only Justices 
Stevens and Marshall in dissent) suggests a Court becoming more committed to 
arbitration as a process and willing to depart from standard statutory construction to 
support this favored process.  Ironically, however, the same Court that was moving 
toward a narrow view of § 1 and the degree of interstate activity required to protect 
workers from unwanted pre-dispute arbitration clauses took a broad view of interstate 
commerce regarding the reach of the Act generally.   
 In a divided opinion in Allied-Bruce Terminex Companies, Inc. v. Dobson,
179
 the 
Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act reaches as broadly as the limits of 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause.  This was hardly a shock in that the 
Act had been considered substantive law for ten years since Southland.  Further, the 
Court has given a broad construction to the concept of interstate commerce at least since 
the New Deal – but was unwilling to take a similar approach to interstate commerce 
when the issue was whether employees could be bound by an arbitration clause 
notwithstanding the exception to arbitration for employment matters set forth in § 1 of the 
Act.  Dobson continues the Court’s support for arbitration in a cases that are defensible 
on their facts but looks bad when juxtaposed with the Court’s unwillingness to give pro-
worker § 1 the same treatment accorded the Act generally.  The consistency of all these 
decisions, however, is primarily their willingness to use dynamic statutory construction 
when it supports expansion of arbitration.  
 In Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer,
180
 the Court was again 
dynamically pro-arbitration in refusing to apply the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
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(COGSA) to prevent arbitration of a dispute in Japan pursuant to a clause in a bill of 
lading for a shipment of oranges from Morocco to Boston, which also included a 
Japanese choice of law provision.  COGSA provides that: 
 
[a]ny clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the 
carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection 
with the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and 
obligations provided in this section, or lessening such liability otherwise 
than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and void and of no effect.
181
 
 
 Given a plain reading, COGSA would appear to foreclose imposition of an 
arbitration agreement if arbitration resulted in any shrinkage of claimant remedies.  But 
the Court majority avoided this seeming command of the statute by holding that the 
arbitration and choice of law clauses were not provisions “lessening liability.”  As Justice 
Stevens explained in dissent: 
 
The foreign-arbitration clause imposes potentially prohibitive costs on the 
shipper, who must travel – and bring his lawyers, witnesses, and exhibits – 
to a distant country in order to seek redress. 
 
* * * 
 
The Court assumes that the words “lessening such liability” must be 
narrowly construed to refer only to the substantive rules that define the 
carrier’s legal obligations.   Under this view, contractual provisions that 
lessen the amount of the consignee’s net recovery, or that lessen the 
likelihood that it will make any recovery at all, are [erroneously placed] 
beyond the scope of the statutes. . . .   In my opinion, this view is flatly 
inconsistent with the purpose of COGSA . . . .
182
 
 
In effect, the Court majority through its minimization of the practical impact of 
the arbitration clause dictating a distant and inconvenient forum and distant applicable 
law, held that COGSA, enacted in 1936, a decade after the Federal Arbitration Act, was 
trumped by the Act notwithstanding that COGSA would appear to be substantive law 
every bit as much as is the Act.  Further, the facts of the case presented a rather 
sympathetic case of a shipper forced to adhere to a seemingly one-sided contract that 
might well fail unconscionability analysis under state law.  As the Stevens dissent noted, 
COGSA was enacted to correct just such problems.
183
   
Reviewing once again § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which makes arbitration 
clauses specifically enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract, Justice Stevens observed that:  
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This language plainly intends to place arbitration clauses upon the same 
footing as all other contractual clauses.  Thus, like any clause, an 
arbitration clause is enforceable “save upon such grounds” as would 
suffice to invalidate any other, nonarbitration clause.  The FAA thereby 
fulfills its policy of jettisoning the prior regime of hostility to arbitration.  
Like any other contractual clause, then, an arbitration clause may be 
invalid without violating the FAA if, for example, it is procured through 
fraud or forgery; there is mutual mistake or impossibility; the provision is 
unconscionable; or, as in this case, the terms of the clause are illegal under 
a separate federal statue which does not evidence a hostility to arbitration.  
Neither the terms nor the policies of the FAA would be thwarted if the 
Court were to hold today that a foreign arbitration clause in a bill of lading 
“lessens liability” under COGSA.  COGSA does not single out arbitration 
clauses for disfavored treatment; it invalidates any clause that lessens the 
carrier’s liability.  Illegality under COGSA is therefore an independent 
ground “for the revocation of any contract,” under FAA § 2.  There is no 
conflict between the two federal statues. 
 
The correctness of this construction becomes even more apparent when 
one considers the policies of the two statutes.  COGSA seeks to ameliorate 
the inequality in bargaining power that comes from a particular form of 
adhesion contract.  The FAA seeks to ensure enforcement of freely 
negotiated agreements to arbitrate. . . . [F]oreign arbitration clauses in bills 
of lading are not freely negotiated.  COGSA’s policy is thus directly 
served by making these clauses illegal; and the FAA’s policy is not 
disserved thereby.  In contrast, allowing such adhesionary clauses to stand 
serves the goals of neither statute.
184
 
 
 Justice Stevens attributed the majority’s error to “overzealous formalism”
185
 but 
the decision appears just as much to be preference for arbitration regardless of the text, 
intent, or purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, a preference embraced in spite of the 
Act’s direction that arbitration agreements be subject to the very same contract-based 
defenses to enforcement listed by Justice Stevens.  Just as disturbingly, Justice Stevens 
dissented alone.  A super-majority of the Court was sufficiently supportive of arbitration 
that it pursued it even in the face of contrary substantive law. 
 Similar substantive preferences for arbitration over states’ rights, federalism and 
the right to regulate was reflected a year later in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto.
186
  
A Subway sandwich shop franchisee sought to avoid arbitration of his dispute with the 
franchiser based on the failure of the arbitration clause in the agreement to comply with 
the requirements of a Montana statute, which provided that “[n]otice that a contract is 
subject to arbitration. . . shall be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the 
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contract; and unless such notice is displayed thereon, the contract may not be subject to 
arbitration.”
 187
 
 Reversing the Montana Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
provision was, because of its focus on arbitration, in violation of the Federal Arbitration 
Act because the state law did not apply to the revocation of “any” contract but only to 
arbitration agreements.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s majority opinion enjoyed a 
supermajority, with only Justice Thomas in dissent, reiterating his view that Southland 
was wrongly decided.
188
 
 Notwithstanding the strength of the Court’s vote and its consistency with federal 
appeals court decisions taking a similarly dim view of similar state laws, Casarotto reads 
like an opinion written by a Court wishing to promote arbitration despite countervailing 
state goals that are completely consistent with the views of the Congress that enacted the 
FAA.  The Montana statute was not a ban on specific enforcement of arbitration clauses 
but simply a means of forcing disclosure to attempt to ensure that arbitration agreements 
are consensual.     
The Montana law was, of course, vulnerable to pre-emption because it singles out 
arbitration.  But this presumably reflected state concern that arbitration agreements 
presented particularly pressing problems of disclosure, consent and fairness.  A court less 
enthused about arbitration could have respected this state policymaking in the traditional 
state domain of contract law and been consistent with the Act.  Although the state statute 
places some additional burden on the drafters of arbitration agreements, the burden is 
light and but a disclosure provision rather than a substantive bar to arbitration.  Further, a 
court less driven to require arbitration could have considered other contract based 
defenses to arbitrability and whether Montana’s information-forcing statute was simply a 
form of that sort of state-centered policing of contracts.
189
   
 In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
190
 the Court expressly addressed the issue it 
had dodged in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane.
191
  The Circuit City Court ruled that    
§ 1 of the Act, which prohibited enforcement of arbitration clauses in employment 
contracts, did not apply to all workers engaged in activity affecting commerce but only 
applied to those directly involved in interstate movement of goods.
192
  In reaching this 
result, the Court took a narrow construction of § 1 and limited the protections of this part 
of the Act to only transportation workers.   
 As he had in Gilmer, Justice Stevens dissented, this time enjoying support from 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Souter.
193
  As in Gilmer, Justice Stevens reviewed the 
legislative history of the Act and convincingly showed congressional desire to protect 
workers subject to adhesionary contracts containing arbitration clauses.
194
  Although the 
language of § 1 could have been broader, it only singles out seamen and railroad workers.  
The catchall of “any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” 
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was broad enough to encompass workers involved in non-transportation activities 
implicating interstate commerce.  Early cases construing § 1 took this view and it was not 
until Tenney Eng., Inc. v. Electrical Workers,
195
 that a contrary view arose in the circuits, 
which were still split at the time of the Circuit City decision.
196
 
 In addition to criticizing the majority’s pre-arbitration reading of § 1, Justice 
Stevens made a persuasive case that the majority ignored both congressional intent and 
legislative purpose underlying the statute.   
 
It is not necessarily wrong for the Court to put its own imprint on a statue.  
But when its refusal to look beyond the raw statutory text enables it to 
disregard countervailing considerations that were expressed by Members 
of the enacting Congress and that remain valid today, the Court misuses its 
authority.  As the history of the legislation indicates, the potential disparity 
in bargaining power between individual employees and large employers 
was the source of organized labor’s opposition to the Act, which it feared 
would require courts to enforce unfair employment contrasts. . . . When 
the Court simply ignores the interest of the unrepresented employee, it 
skews its interpretation with its own policy preferences. 
 
* * * 
 
A method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and 
hence unconstrained, may produce a result that is consistent with a court’s 
own views of how things should be, but it may also defeat the very 
purpose for which a provision was enacted.  That is the sad result in this 
case.
197
 
 
 Justice Souter’s dissent, also joined by the other three dissenters, noted the 
difficult-to-defend inconsistency of the Court’s broad construction of § 2, which makes 
arbitration agreements specifically enforceable save for contract-based revocation 
defenses, and the Court’s narrow construction of § 1 so as to limit employee protection to 
only transportation workers.
198
  Although not speaking in the language of traditional-
versus-dynamic statutory construction, the dissent in essence spotlighted the 
inconsistency prompting this article’s call for symmetry in construction of the Act 
through the expansion of judicial review of arbitration awards. 
 The Court continued its obvious policy preference for arbitration in Buckeye 
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna.
199
  In Buckeye, the Court addressed a variant of the 
Prima Paint issue of allocation of initial interpretative authority between the court and 
arbitrator.
200
  The Court held that an issue of whether an allegedly usurious contract 
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containing an arbitration clause was illegal and thus void and unenforceable was for the 
arbitrator,
201
 a result that can be justified under Prima Paint even if incorrect or unwise.  
Buckeye is thus an example of continued dynamic statutory construction in the service of 
keeping more dispute resolution activity before the arbitrator rather than the courts.   
 Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc.,
202
 took the pro-arbitration sentiment of 
the Court further in that it prevented parties to an arbitration agreement from 
consensually expanding judicial review of arbitration.  Hall Street held that parties to an 
arbitration agreement could not stipulate to more searching judicial review of any 
resulting award, in particular de novo review of the arbitrator’s legal determinations 
rather than the more limited menu of grounds for vacating an award set forth in 9 U.S.C. 
§ 10.  The Court viewed this as an improper attempt to change the applicable law or to 
attempt to control the courts.
203
   
 Justices Stevens, Kennedy and Breyer dissented.
204
 All essentially argued that the 
Federal Arbitration Act did not preclude such agreements to enlarge the scope of review.  
The Stevens dissent noted that there was precedent permitting such agreements prior to 
the Act and that neither the text nor the legislative history of the Act suggested that 
Congress intended to overturn these precedents.
205
  Hall Street strengthens arbitration by 
preventing judicial review in excess of that provided by § 10 of the Act.  But in 
“protecting” the courts from litigant efforts to control their discharge of statutory duty, 
Hall Street is something of a throwback to pre-Act judicial rulings that refused to enforce 
arbitration agreements on the theory that they improperly “ousted” courts from their 
established jurisdiction.  Inconsistently, Hall Street devalues the “freedom of contract” 
concept that animated passage of the Act as well as the sentiment of the commercial 
community that fueled passage of the Act.  Businesses wanted to have courts enforce 
arbitration agreements but Hall Street thwarts that goal.  By Hall Street’s reasoning, the 
Federal Arbitration Act itself could be characterized as an imposition on the courts that 
the judiciary can reject in order to avoid being unduly burdened. 
 The arbitration jurisprudence of the Roberts Court became increasingly 
problematic in 2010 and 2011.  In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International 
Corp.,
206
 a customer sought class action proceedings in its arbitration with the shipper 
when accusing the shipper of illegal price fixing.  The arbitration clause of the shipping 
contract (a/k/a charter party) used broad language and no one contested that the matter 
was subject to arbitration.
207
  But the shipper was strongly opposed to class action 
treatment of the claim.  The appointed arbitrators considered the issue and after the 
hearing determined to proceed with class treatment of the case but stayed proceedings 
pending judicial review.
208
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The federal district court vacated this “award” (which, as Justice Ginsburg 
pointed out in dissent, was not really what one thinks of as an arbitration award because it 
was not a final ruling on the merits and did not order any relief on the merits of the 
underlying claim) on the ground that the arbitrators had shown “manifest disregard” of 
law because they had failed to conduct a choice of law analysis.
209
  The Second Circuit 
reversed and reinstated the arbitration panel decision.
210
  Subsequently, the Supreme 
Court vacated the decision to proceed on a class basis, holding that class treatment was 
improper absent sufficient proof that the shipper (Stolt-Nielsen) had affirmatively 
consented to class action arbitration even though it was uncontested that it had consented 
to arbitration in general.
211
   
Stolt-Nielsen, a reasonably close 6-3 decision, could be viewed as a curtailment of 
the Court’s general affinity for arbitration.  The decision, after all, has the immediate 
practical effect of limiting an arbitration panel’s power over a dispute.  But Stolt-Nielsen 
reflects not so much a cooling of arbitral ardor so much as it reveals dramatic 
inconsistency in the Court’s support for arbitration.  In most of the cases of the modern 
(post-Southland) era, the Court has given no serious consideration to issues of consent in 
the formation of an arbitration agreement.  But in Stolt-Nielsen, where the party resisting 
broader arbitration was the party with greater commercial power and where the relief 
requested would empower claimants, the Court is suddenly gripped with concern over 
whether there exists sufficient consent to arbitrate.
212
  The law of arbitrability as set forth 
in the Court’s pre-Stolt-Nielsen cases of the modern, pro-arbitration era, has been broad 
construction of broadly worded arbitration agreements and the presumption that unless 
stated to the contrary, arbitration generally should be able to accord the same remedies 
that are available in litigation.   
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent (joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer)
213
 makes the 
unassailable argument that the matter was not a final award subject to review under the 
Act (9 U.S.C. § 10)
214
 and takes the sensible view that an agreement to arbitration 
ordinarily carries with it an agreement to arbitrate according to whatever rules govern the 
proceeding as applied by the arbitrators.   
 
The panel did just what it was commissioned to do.  It construed the broad 
arbitration clause (covering “[a]ny dispute arising from the making, 
performance or termination of this Charter Party,” . . . and ruled, expressly 
and only, that the clause permitted class arbitration.  The Court acts 
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without warrant in allowing Stolt-Nielsen essentially to repudiate its 
submission of the contract-construction issue to the arbitration panel, and 
to gain, in place of the arbitrators’ judgment, this Court’s de novo 
determination. 
 
The controlling FAA prescription, § 10(a) authorizes a court to vacate an 
arbitration panel’s decision only in very unusual circumstances.”
215
 
 
 In Stolt-Nielsen, “[t]he question properly before the Court is not whether the 
arbitrators’ ruling was erroneous but whether the arbitrators ‘exceeded their powers.’ 
[under 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(4)].  The arbitrators decided a threshold issue, explicitly 
committed to them, about the procedural mode available for presentation of 
AnimalFeeds’ antitrust claims.”
216
   
As the dissent also noted, the right question to ask in cases like Stolt-Nielsen is 
“the proper default rule when there is no stipulation.”
217
  Where industry-wide arbitration 
is the norm, one would logically expect the dispute resolution norm to be one of 
according full remedies commensurate with the dispute.  And, as the dissent also noted 
“[w]hen adjudication is costly and individual claims are no more than modest in size, 
class proceedings may be ‘the thing,’ i.e., without them, potential claimants will have 
little, if any, incentive to seek vindication of their rights.”
218
   
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,
219
 found the Court back in an unbridled pro-
arbitration mode, holding that an arbitration clause challenged as unconscionable by a 
former employee bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 discrimination suit must first be assessed 
by the arbitrator rather than the court.  The clause was broadly drafted, stating that the 
arbitrator “and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive 
authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability 
or formation” of the agreement that was “not limited to any claim that all or any part of” 
the agreement was void or voidable.
220
    But by reading the clause broadly and literally 
to preclude judicial assessment of the fairness of the provision, the Court ignored the very 
language of § 2 of the Act, which permits contract-based claims for revocation of an 
arbitration agreement. 
 Coming less than two months after the Court’s protection in Stolt-Nielsen of a 
large shipping company that had not (in the majority’s view) adequately “consented” to 
class treatment of allegations that it had engaged in price fixing, it was inconsistent for 
the Court to exhibit little or no concern over the employee’s “consent” to a clause that 
truly does seek to oust courts from even the jurisdiction left to them by the drafters of the 
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Federal Arbitration Act.  Similarly odd is the Rent-A-Center Court’s willingness to 
permit this when it only two years earlier was unwilling to permit the expanded judicial 
review of arbitration awards sought by the contracting parties in Hall Street.
221
  The 
decisions seem irreconcilable except by reference to a raw preference for arbitration with 
limited judicial involvement – but (per Stolt-Nielsen) piecemeal arbitration of claims 
rather than class treatment. 
 The majority’s reasoning is circular in that it prevents (until after an award and a 
§ 10 challenge to the award) judicial scrutiny of the arbitration clause even though the 
worker’s very argument is that the clause was obtained through improper means 
(procedural unconscionability) or was unreasonably favorable to the employer 
(substantive unconscionability).  In particular, the arbitration clause contained a fee-
sharing provision that the trial court had determined was not substantively 
unconscionable and which had been affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, with other 
unconscionability arguments pending review had the Supreme Court not intervened.
222
  
 The Rent-A-Center majority justified its holding as a natural extension of Prima 
Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
223
 and Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
224
 
which held that attacks on the contract containing an arbitration clause are for the 
arbitrator because such attacks do not question the validity of the arbitration clause itself.  
But allowing arbitrators to assess contract revocation defenses that do not focus on 
arbitration is one thing.  Allowing boilerplate arbitration agreements imposed on 
employees (who would be free of such clauses had the Court decided Gilmer or Circuit 
City correctly) is quite another.   
Rent-A-Center, was consistent with the Court’s dynamic, pro-arbitration approach 
to the Act.  Under Rent-A-Center, it is not enough to require judicial enforcement of 
arbitration clauses after judicial investigation determines they apply to the dispute and are 
not subject to a revocation defense under § 2.  Now, parties favoring arbitration, even the 
highly problematic mass arbitration that was foreign to the drafters of the Act, can 
remove courts from inquiry altogether, restricting the judicial role to its limited authority 
to police arbitration awards after the fact pursuant to the limited scope of § 10 of the Act 
(that is, unless, the Court takes an unjustifiably expansive view of § 10, as it did in Stolt-
Nielsen). 
 Then came AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
225
 which involved the purchase 
by Vincent and Lisa Concepcion of mobile phones subject to an AT&T Mobility 
(“AT&T”) service contract.  And like most cellphone service contracts, the AT&T 
contract provided for arbitration, including the right of AT&T to “make unilateral 
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amendments, which it did to the arbitration provisions on several occasions.”
226
  The 
Concepcions brought litigation alleging the improper charging of $30.22 in sales tax on 
the supposedly “free” phones they received from AT&T as part of the service agreement, 
a complaint that was consolidated with a putative class action alleging fraud and false 
advertising in that the company had advertised the phones as “free” as part of the service 
arrangement.
227
   
 AT&T in turn moved to compel arbitration of the Concepcion claim.  The 
Concepcions resisted, asserting that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and 
“unlawfully exculpatory under California law because it disallowed classwide 
procedures.”
228
  Because the arbitration clause forbade class action treatment of claims, 
the trial court and the Ninth Circuit found it unconscionable under California law on the 
strength of Discover Bank v. Superior Court,
229
 which held that limitations on remedies 
such as a ban on class actions were unconscionable contract provisions.   
 Notwithstanding that Discover Bank and earlier class action precedent such as 
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services
230
 can reasonably be characterized 
as unconscionability decisions in which the unreasonably fair terms simply happened to 
be contained in an arbitration clause,
231
 the Concepcion majority characterized California 
law as specifically anti-arbitration law that was precluded by the Act. “The question in 
this case is whether § 2 pre-empts California’s rule classifying most collective arbitration 
waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable.  We refer to this rule as the Discover 
Bank rule. . . . California courts have frequently applied this rule [that waivers in 
consumer contracts that limit consumer remedies are unconscionable] to find arbitration 
agreements unconscionable.”
232
   
 The Concepcion majority construed Discover Bank to be a restriction on 
arbitration rather than an unconscionability rule of which a particular contract provision 
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(the AT&T arbitration agreement) ran afoul.  In doing so, it embraced the view of critics 
who had opposed this application of California unconscionability law.
233
   
 
The overarching purpose of the FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, 
is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their 
terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.  Requiring the 
availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes 
of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.
234
  
  
 Beyond this formalist but erroneous analysis (in error because it so misread the 
statutory language and congressional intent and purpose as well as ignoring federalism 
concerns),
235
 the Concepcion majority was also engaged in dynamic construction that 
expanded the arbitration imposition and arbitration enforcement portions of the Act, 
236
 at 
least so long as the arbitration is bilateral, limited in scope, and not vested with too many 
of the leveling characteristics of litigation such as class treatment, liberal joinder of 
parties, and broad access to discovery.
237
 
In particular, the majority saw California unconscionability law as a barrier that 
must be dismantled out of a view that arbitration works best when bilateral and that 
“[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation” and “increases risks 
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Classwide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and different 
procedures and involving higher stakes.  Confidentiality becomes more difficult.  And 
while it is theoretically possible to select an arbitrator with some expertise relevant to the 
class-certification question, arbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the often-
dominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the protection of absent parties. . . . . 
 
[A] switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage of 
arbitration – its informality – and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely 
to generate procedural morass than final judgment. . . . .  
 
Second, class arbitration requires procedural formality. . . . We find it unlikely that in 
passing the FAA Congress meant to leave the disposition of these procedural 
requirements to an arbitrator [but this observation comes from the same Court that in 
Rent-A-Center was willing to allow the arbitrator to have total control of determining 
whether the arbitration clause at issue encompassed the instant dispute]. . . .  
 
Third, class arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants. . . . .  
 
Arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation. 
42 
 
to defendants.”
238
  Once again, the Court is embracing arbitration when it serves the 
interest of the business establishment and requiring adherence to arbitration clauses 
generally so that arbitration replaces much litigation.  But at the same time, the Court is 
also embracing a view that leverage to plaintiffs provided by class treatment is so 
threatening to business defendants as to unfairly coerce settlement.
239
  Although this has 
long been a rallying cry of forces opposing class actions, the most sophisticated 
scholarship on the topic has largely debunked this view as a canard.
240
 
 In Concepcion, the dissenters reflect a stronger commitment to the standard rules 
of adjudication and a more realistic picture of the practical implications of the decision to 
which they object.  In the main, however, the dissenters are simply truer than the majority 
to both federalism concerns and legislative intent and purpose.
241
 
 But the dissenters, like the majority, also could not resist a public policy 
argument.  But at least the public policy of the dissenters recognizes the realities of small 
claims practice and the potential for class treatment to level the playing field upon which 
larger, wealthier, repeat player institutional litigants contend with largely unorganized 
individuals of modest means.  More important in terms of the mainstream rules of 
jurisprudence, the dissent reflects the type of respect for traditional state contract law 
prerogatives reflected in the text of the Act and its legislative history.
242
 Emphasizing 
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 See id. at 1751-52.    
239
 See id. at 1752. 
240
 See Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1357 (2003); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision: Opportunities for 
Improvement Through a More Functional Approach to Class Treatment of Disputes, 83 WASH. U.L.Q. 
1127, 1128-29, 1227-1230 (2006) (collecting literature debating degree of coercive force in class actions).  
241
 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Discover 
Bank rule does not create a ‘blanket policy in California against class action waivers in the consumer 
context.’ Instead, it represents the ‘application of a more general [unconscionability] principle.’ Court’s 
applying California law have enforced class-action waivers where they satisfy general unconscionability 
standards...[A]nd even when they fail, the parties remain free to devise other dispute mechanisms, 
including informal mechanisms that, in context, will not prove unconscionable.”); see also id. (observing 
that Discover Bank is “consistent with the federal Act’s language” as well as its purpose and that Congress 
in passing the Act was not endorsing arbitration so much as it was endorsing enforcement of otherwise 
valid contracts to arbitrate). See also id. at 1757-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Justice Ginsburg asked:  
“[w]here does the majority get its contrary idea – that individual, rather than class, arbitration is a 
“fundamental attribute[e]” of arbitration?  The majority does not explain.  And it is unlikely to be able to 
trace its present view to the history of the arbitration statute itself.” ). See also id. at 1757-81 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting): 
 
Because California applies the same legal principles to address the unconscionability of 
class arbitration waivers as it does to address the unconscionability of any other 
contractual provision, the merits of class proceedings should not factor into our decision.  
If California had applied its law of duress to void an arbitration agreement, would it 
matter if the procedures in the coerced agreement were efficient? 
 
242
 Id. at 1761 (citations omitted): 
 
What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for 
the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”  In California’s perfectly rational 
view, nonclass arbitration over such sums will also sometimes have the effect of 
depriving claimants of their claims (say, for example, where claiming the $30.22 were to 
involve filling out many forms that require technical legal knowledge or waiting at great 
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their legislative intent and purpose advantages over the majority, the dissenters also noted 
that it was quite clear that in passing the Act, Congress was focused on merchants acting 
“under the customs of their industries, where the parties possessed roughly equivalent 
bargaining power.”
243
   
 Although the dissent hews considerably closer to mainstream approaches to 
statutory construction and to the text and legislative intent of the Act than does the 
Concepcion majority, the majority was able to put together an argument based on 
precedent because the Court’s arbitration decisions of the prior 30 years had steadily 
moved away from fidelity to statutory text, legislative intent, the purpose of the Act, and 
concern for values of consent and fairness in contracting.  Instead of more traditional 
statutory construction, the Court’s arbitration decisions have been marked by an 
evolution in its view of the Act or even a re-writing of the Act that dynamically expanded 
the use of arbitration.   
 The Concepcion majority was so intent on striking down California’s use of the 
authority provided in § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act that it exhibited a truly 
embarrassing moment of judicial Alzheimer’s.  After criticizing California’s Discover 
Bank doctrine of unconscionability as unduly targeted against arbitration, the Concepcion 
majority observed that “[o]f course States remain free to take steps addressing the 
concerns that attend contracts of adhesion – for example, requiring class-action-waiver 
provisions in adhesive arbitration agreements to be highlighted.”
244
  The problem, of 
course, is that the Court prohibited just this type of state disclosure statute in Doctor’s 
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto a mere 15 years earlier
245
   
 In its modern era, the Court has reflected an unrealistically positive view of the 
wonders of arbitration – so upbeat that it is willing in most cases to impose arbitration in 
situations far exceeding those envisioned by the drafters of the Federal Arbitration Act
246
 
despite significant issues of states’ rights, the quality of contract consent, the fairness of 
the arbitration tribunal, and the overall operation of the dispute resolution system.  But at 
crucial junctures, the Court strains to rein in arbitration when concerned that arbitration 
may reach results the Court dislikes or come to resemble litigation.  On one metaphorical 
hand, the Court expands the reach of the Act through dynamic statutory construction 
(albeit often sub silentio) while on the other hand, it thwarts arbitration developments it 
dislikes through application of more traditional statutory approaches (albeit inconsistently 
applied) and the majority’s personal preference as to what constitutes acceptably 
conducted arbitration. 
                                                 
length while a call is placed on hold).  Discover Bank sets forth circumstances in which 
the California courts believe that the terms of consumer contracts can be manipulated to 
insulate an agreement’s author from liability for its own frauds by “deliberately cheating 
large numbers of consumer out of individually small sums of money.”  Why is this kind 
of decision – weighing the pros and cons of all class proceedings alike – not California’s 
to make?  
 
243
 Id. at 1759 (citing legislative history materials). 
244
 Id. at 1750, n. 6.   
245
 See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Stempel, Tainted Love, supra note 11, 
at 875-76 (providing a detailed discussion of this embarrassing bout of judicial Alzheimer’s that afflicted 
the Concepcion majority).  
246
 See 9 U.S.C. §§1-16 (2006). 
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During the past three decades, the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to arbitration 
disputes
247
 has usually reflected zeal for arbitration and a corresponding if subconscious 
derogation of litigation, at least if resorted to by consumers or employees.  This has 
produced an inconsistent, oft-criticized body of Federal Arbitration Act jurisprudence.
248
  
In particular, the support for arbitration and willingness to stretch the reach of the Act 
seems to apply only when arbitration functions as the Court thinks it should.
249
  For 
example, where arbitration seeks to embrace classwide solutions to disputes, the majority 
becomes hostile.
250
  It also becomes less supportive of arbitration when arbitration 
becomes too close to litigation or too seemingly advantageous to less powerful 
disputants,
251
 in particular with regard to class treatment of disputes, something largely 
opposed by the business community that seems to enjoy particular favor with the 
Court.
252
  Inconsistently, the Court resists when commercial actors seek to stipulate to 
broader judicial review of an arbitration award.
253
 
 In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,
254
 Rent-A-Center West, 
Inc. v. Jackson,
255
 and, most recently in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion,
256
  the 
Roberts Court far exceeded its predecessors in problematic attitudes toward arbitration.   
In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court overturned an arbitration panel’s considered decision to permit 
class action treatment of a matter based on the record of the dispute and the custom and 
practice of dispute resolution in this industry.
257
   In Rent-A-Center, the Court permitted 
the drafter of the arbitration agreement to eject the judiciary from process of determining 
whether an arbitration agreement had in fact been made – a decision at odds with the 
statutory language and the Court’s recent prior precedent in Hall Street forbidding the 
parties to agree to an expanded judicial role in policing arbitration agreements and 
                                                 
247
 I talk of the “Court” primarily as a matter of shorthand, recognizing of course that many of the 
Court’s arbitration decisions have involved a division among the Justices, including some 5-4 votes on 
important issues.  To be sure, some of the Justices are not under the spell of arbitration – but the Court as a 
whole has been from approximately the mid-1980s to the present. 
248
 Although there is of course substantial scholarship generally approving the Court’s modern 
arbitration jurisprudence, the bulk of commentary on the Court’s arbitration decisions of the past 40 years 
has been quite critical.  See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability and Equilibrium:  The 
Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 757, 813-20 (2004)(collecting citations); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect 
Big Business; Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in a Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. 
REV. 33; Jean Sternlight, Arbitration:  Panacea or Corporate Tool?  Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 637 (1996).    
249
 See Stempel, Tainted Love, supra note 11. 
250
 See supra text accompanying notes 206-218 & 225-260 (discussing the Court’s decisions in Stolt-
Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp. and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion). 
251
 In AT&T Mobility LLC  v. Concepcion, the Court did both. It (or, rather, five out of nine of its 
members) lavishly praised arbitration while simultaneously suggesting that all of these wonderful attributes 
of arbitration were eradicated if the arbitration involved classwide treatment of a dispute.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 225-260. 
252
 See generally supra notes 15-20 (noting degree to which the Court in recent years has favored 
business litigants and results generally regarded as ideologically and politically conservative).  
253
 See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); see supra text and 
accompanying notes 202-211. 
254
 Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
255
 Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
256
 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).   
257
 See supra text accompanying notes 206. 
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outcomes.
258
  In Concepcion, the Court struck down a decision refusing to uphold an 
arbitration clause restricting class actions based on California state contract law that 
deemed unconscionable such contractual limitations on consumer remedies.   
Concepcion is a particularly glaring display (by a bare 5-4 majority vote) of the 
Court’s infatuation with  arbitration overcoming what should have been its fidelity to the 
language, legislative intent, and purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act as well as 
inadequate appreciation of states’ rights and the legal system’s commitment to making 
the class action remedy available in apt cases.
259
  Concepcion, like Stolt-Nielsen, is also a 
reflection of the Court’s uneven view toward arbitration – supporting imposition of 
arbitration through a dynamic and expansive approach to the statute but invoking more 
conservative and formal statutory construction jurisprudence when addressing limits on 
arbitration or means by which arbitration may operate more like litigation or serve the 
less powerful disputants.
260
 
IV. RETHINKING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS 
 As reflected in a review of the Supreme Court’s expansive arbitration decisions of 
the past 30 years, the Act has been transformed from a procedural device applicable in 
federal court to enforce commercial arbitration clauses into a national law mandating 
mass arbitration of consumer and employment disputes.  In effect, arbitration has 
transplanted litigation for many types of disputes as it has moved from subsets of 
merchants (e.g., international shippers) into the new mass arbitration (e.g., complaints 
about mobile phones, disputes over credit card debt).   
 But in spite of having converted arbitration from a consensual arrangement 
between merchants into a de facto default method of dispute resolution for vendors 
willing to impose arbitration upon consumers or workers, the Court has inconsistently 
acted to prevent the incorporation of procedural devices such as class resolution.
261
  
Perhaps even more troublingly, it has been unwilling to give adequate deference to 
statutory restrictions on arbitration
262
 and unwilling to permit parties to expand the scope 
of judicial review of the arbitrations they choose.
263
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 See supra text accompanying notes 219-224. 
259
 See supra text accompanying notes 225-258. 
260
 See Stempel, supra note 240 (noting degree to which class treatment of issues tends to increase the 
leverage of less powerful litigants and that institutional or “repeat player” litigants such as governments, 
businesses, or insurers tend have this power in ordinary, non-class litigation)., accord, Bruce Hay & David 
Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions:  Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1377, 1378-82 (2000) (noting leveling effect of class treatment).  For discussion of the 
degree to which “repeat player” litigants have advantages over “one-shot” litigants (e.g., consumers, 
employees, debtors), see Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:  Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (the “seminal article” on this point); see also Stempel, 
supra note 240, at 1166; Joel B. Grossman, Herbert M. Kritzer & Stewart Macaulay, Do the “Haves” Still 
Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 803, 809 (1999) (finding continued vitality in Professor 
Galanter’s typology and observation). 
261
 See supra text accompanying notes 206-260 (discussing Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds and 
Concepcion). 
262
 See supra text accompanying notes 180-185 (discussing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V 
Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 530 (1995). 
263
 See supra text accompanying notes 202-211 (discussing Hall Street v. Mattel). 
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 Under these circumstances, some restoration of symmetry is in order.  If 
arbitration is to supplant litigation en masse, at least the arbitration that takes place 
should be adequately subject to the rule of law.  When arbitration results no longer turn 
on guild folkways or the special norms of a given industry but instead involve millions of 
ordinary consumer transactions, this new expanded net of arbitration logically requires 
judicial review commensurate with arbitration’s new role.  This in turn requires adequate 
judicial policing of arbitration awards to ensure that they comply with applicable law.   
Achieving this, in the absence of congressional legislation, requires the Court to construe 
this portion of the Act as dynamically as it has the arbitration enforcement sections of the 
law.
264
   
As previously noted, the Act, particularly as currently construed by a working 
majority of the Court, is tilted toward enforcing arbitration awards.
265
  Section 10 of the 
Act permits arbitration awards to be challenged, but on grounds considerably narrower 
than those available in litigation.
266
  Specifically, an arbitration award may be vacated: 
 
• where the award was “procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;” 
 
• where there was “evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or 
either of them;” 
 
• where the arbitrators erred by refusing to delay a hearing for good cause 
or to hear “pertinent and material evidence” or where there was “any other 
misbehavior” prejudicing the rights of the parties; or 
 
• where the arbitrators exceeded the scope of their power in light of the 
matter submitted to them or “so imperfectly” executed their power “that a 
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was 
not made.”
267
 
 
 The clearest portions of §10 are fine as far as they go.  Of course awards that are 
the product of fraud, corruption, duress, or clear favoritism should not stand.  But the 
case law of §10 and motions to disqualify arguably tainted arbitrators prior to the 
rendering of an award suggests that courts take the impartiality of arbitrators somewhat 
less seriously than they treat judicial disqualification.
268
  A full examination of this 
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 See supra text accompanying notes 92-95 (describing the structure and content of the Act). 
265
 See 9 U.S.C. §9 (2006) (specifying that federal courts may confirm awards and enter judgment 
based on the award which in turn gives the prevailing arbitration party the normal range of judgment 
collection tool under applicable procedural law); see also 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2006) (providing limited grounds 
for making technical or numerical corrections to ministerial errors of arbitration awards); see also 9 U.S.C. 
§16 (2006) (governing appeals and reflecting congressional preference (largely through 1990 amendments 
rather than the original 1925 enactment) to reduce appellate challenge to pro-arbitration orders but permits 
appellate review of orders refusing to compel arbitration or refusing to stay judicial proceedings pending 
arbitration).  
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 See 9 U.S.C. §10 (2006) (providing that reviewing court may direct a rehearing by the arbitrators if 
ground for vacating award is shown). 
267
 See id. 
268
 See Nancy A. Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural Bias, and 
Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards, 42 SW. U. L. REV. 187, 206-10 (2012) (concluding conflicts of 
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shortcoming is beyond the scope of this article but substantial scholarly commentary 
supports treating issues of arbitrator impartiality akin to the manner in which reviewing 
courts insist on judicial impartiality.
269
  Admittedly, the language of § 10 is narrower than 
that of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
270
 and its state analogs as well as the 
federal disqualification statute.
271
  Further, the Congress of the Federal Arbitration Act 
appears to have intended no greater policing of arbitrator impartiality.
272
  But the 
                                                 
interest, bias, lack of neutrality of arbitrators taken less seriously than disqualification of judges on similar 
grounds) [hereinafter Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards]; Nancy A. Welsh, What is “(Im)Partial 
Enough” in a World of Embedded Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395 (2010) [hereinafter Embedded 
Neutrals]. 
269
  See, e.g., Welsh, Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards, supra note 268 ; Welsh, Embedded 
Neutrals, supra note 268; Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929 (2010); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA 
to Permit Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214 (2007); Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Keeping Arbitrations from Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251 (2007); Paul F. Kirgis, Judicial 
Review and the Limits of Arbitral Authority:  Lessons from the Law of Contact, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 99 
(2007).  This is not to say that courts consistently do a good job regarding judicial impartiality.   For 
example, in one notorious case, a state supreme court judge participated (casting the then-deciding vote) in 
a case in which a defendant company’s CEO had provided more then $3 million of electoral support to the 
judge in a recent election. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed on due process grounds, but only by a 5-4 
vote.  See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!?  Giving Adequate Attention to Failings of 
Judicial Impartiality, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2010) (describing case and state judge’s clearly erroneous 
failure to recuse as well as Court’s ruling). In another judicial cliff-hanger of sorts, the Court in another 5-4 
vote disqualified a federal trial judge who sat in the case of a multi-million dollar deal involving a 
university of which he was a board member. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 
(1988). The trial judge whose indefensible conduct was so strongly defended by the dissenters was 
subsequently convicted of taking bribes and removed from the bench.  See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION 
OF LAWYERS:  STATUTES AND STANDARDS 510 (7th ed. 2005). 
270
 In contrast to § 10’s ban on bias, corruption, or evident partiality, § 2.11 of the ABA Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct, which has been largely adopted in each state, requires disqualification when the judge’s 
“impartiality might be reasonably questioned” as well as when the judge has bias, prejudice, or mere 
personal knowledge of the parties or the dispute.  In addition, § 2.11 requires disqualification in the event 
of family or financial connections linking the judge to the litigants or the case; so does the federal 
disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455.  Further, the Model Judicial Code (in Canons 3 & 4) also places 
limits on judicial behavior broader than those imposed on most arbitrators. This is not to say that there are 
no rules governing arbitrators.  Organizations such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and 
Judicial and Mediation Services (JAMS) have codes of ethics and rules of their own regarding 
disqualification of neutral arbitrators (recall than in some arbitrations, each side appoints an arbitrator who 
is permitted to be a partisan advocate).  But even if these strictures were as strong as those applied to state 
and federal judges, the fact remains that many mass arbitrations are conducted not by respected 
organizations of this type but by other organizations that may be unduly supportive of repeat player 
disputants who can continue to provide work to the organization.  Or the arbitrators may be part of an 
employer or vendor’s own “in-house” system of arbitration or be subject to no organizational strictures. 
271
 The federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455 requires disqualification if there are any of a number of family 
or financial interests of the judge implicated in the controversy (§ 455(b)) while § 455(a) requires 
disqualification whenever the arbitrator’s impartiality is subject to reasonable question. 
272
 The Act’s legislative history, both in general and regarding arbitrators disqualification, is sparse.  
See STEPHEN K. HUBER & MAUREEN A. WESTON, ARBITRATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 1-14 (3d ed. 
2011); IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW 
ch. 1 (1994) (probably the most extensive treatment of legislative history of Act found in treatises); 
Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy, supra note 88, at 260-265.  Indeed, the legislative history is so sparse or 
considered so distant in time and practical use that many casebooks or treatises devote no attention to the 
passage of the Act.  See, e.g., JAY FOLBERG ET AL., RESOLVING DISPUTES:  THEORY, PRACTICE AND LAW 
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dynamic expansion of §§ 2-4 of the Act requires a corresponding expansion of § 10’s 
strictures regarding arbitrator neutrality.  Sauce for the goose of mass arbitration imposed 
through “agreements” reflected in package inserts should also be sauce for the gander of 
ensuring that this new form of modern mass arbitration be adequately policed for 
adjudicator neutrality in a manner reflecting its status as a substitute for litigation rather 
than a means of honoring industry norms. 
Other § 10 grounds for vacating an award also make sense.  An award that is the 
product of unduly hurried or truncated arbitration in which one or both parties lacked fair 
opportunity to present the case should also be set aside (§ 10(3)).  Likewise, when 
arbitrators render awards clearly beyond the scope of what was submitted for decision 
(the “exceeded their powers” language of § 10(4)), the award should not stand.  But what 
about arbitration awards that are legally incorrect?  Surely such awards are at least as 
troublesome as those emerging from a biased arbitrator (who nonetheless may reach the 
correct result) or where the arbitrators refused to provide a disputant with an additional 
deposition or production of documents that may or may not have impacted the result. 
Consider a charitable pledge with an arbitration clause on which the donor fails to 
make the promised contribution.  Currently, nearly 80 percent of the states provide that 
promises to make charitable gifts are enforceable even if they lack consideration by the 
recipient.
273
  If the arbitration clause provided for application of the law of one of these 
states,
274
 an arbitration award refusing to order payment because of lack of consideration 
would be clearly incorrect – and would clearly create a different result in arbitration than 
what would have been obtained in either state or federal court subject to that state’s 
law.
275
   
Disparate results between arbitration and litigation would seem unjustified.  A 
deal should be enforceable or unenforceable without regard to the forum in which it is the 
                                                 
(2d ed. 2010); LEONARD RISKIN, ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS (4th ed. 2009) (abridged).  
The most logical conclusion is that the enacting Congress meant what it said in the text of § 10 and wanted 
to upend arbitration awards only in cases of clear bias or similarly troubling issues rather than based on a 
broader notion that arbitrators should be at sufficient arms length from the disputants or the controversy.  
Recall that when the Act was passed, its drafters envisioned arbitrations involving merchants in a particular 
industry, making it likely that many arbitrators would of course have familiarity with the industry and its 
participants. 
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 See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 225-27 (6th ed. 2009); E. ALLAN 
FARNWORTH, CONTRACTS 91-92 (4th ed. 2004); EPSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 53, at 283; AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1981); Steve Thel & Edward Yorio, The 
Promissory Basis of Past Consideration, 78 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1080-81 (1992).  See, e.g., Jewish Fed’n v. 
Baroness, 560 A.2d 1353 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) (enforcing on grounds of public policy); 
Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cnty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (1927) (leading case in the area authored by 
then Judge Benjamin Cardozo, but one finding promissory estoppel rather than express absence of need for 
consideration to make gift pledge binding). 
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 For example, Iowa.  See, e.g., Salisbury v. Northwestern Bell, 221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974); see 
also PERILLO, supra note 273, at 225-227 (citing cases); FARNSWORTH, supra note 273, at § 2.19 (citing 
cases). 
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 As all judges presumably know, the rules of law announced in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64 (1938) and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) were designed to achieve 
uniformity between state and federal adjudication of similar disputes, at least in terms of applicable law, by 
requiring use of relevant state law – including application of the choice of law rules of the forum state -- in 
federal court matters where jurisdiction was not founded on a federal question.  See FLEMING JAMES, JR., 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 2.13-2.17 (6th ed. 2011). 
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subject of dispute.   Even if the arbitration clause was silent as to applicable law, a 
decision requiring consideration to enforce the promise simply seems wrong in that it 
runs counter to the great bulk of American law on the issue.
276
 
 But under the prevailing approach of § 10 review, these types of pretty clearly 
incorrect arbitration decisions are unlikely to be overturned.  Some courts have 
interpreted § 10 broadly to create a “manifest disregard of law” ground for vacating an 
arbitration award.
277
  Under this approach, an award may be set aside if “the arbitrators 
appreciated the existence and applicability of a controlling legal rule but intentionally 
decided not to apply it.”
278
  Although there is considerable variance in judicial use of the 
manifest disregard approach and little definitive Supreme Court discussion,
279
 
particularly in the modern era of mass arbitration, there is no doubt that manifest 
disregard review of arbitration awards is substantially narrower than ordinary appellate 
review regarding errors of law and that § 10 in operation is far more deferential to 
arbitration outcomes than the yardstick courts apply to trial outcomes.
280
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 In addition, real world cases will often involve nontrivial evidence of detrimental reliance by the 
charitable organization promised a gift (at least if the gift is large) and the doctrine of promissory estoppels 
may apply to make the pledge enforceable. 
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 The doctrine has roots in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 47 (1989) but has never really been 
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circuits have different approaches to the doctrine.  In Wilko, the Court stated that while “the interpretations 
of the law” by arbitrators are not subject to judicial review under the Arbitration Act but suggested that  
decisions reflecting “manifest disregard” may be subject to review; see 346 U.S. at 436-37.  See also 
Thomas V. Burch, Manifest Disregard and the Imperfect Procedural Justices of Arbitration, 59 U. KAN. L. 
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 Cytyc Corp. v. Deka Prods. Ltd. P’ship, 439 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2006) (cited as a “common 
formulation of the test for manifest disregard.”).  See Drahozal, supra note 277, at 235 (noting that some 
circuits make it more difficult to invoke the doctrine by adding “that [the] law [at issue] must be “well 
defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.”)  See Drahozal, supra note 277, at 235 (citing Bear, 
Stearns & Co. v. 1109580 Ontario, Inc., 409 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
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 See Drahozal,  supra note 277, at 235, noting that every federal appellate court has used some form 
of manifest disregard of law review and also observing: 
 
As a  “non-statutory” or “judicially created” ground for vacating arbitration awards, based on 
dicta in an overruled Supreme Court case, [manifest disregard] lacks a firm doctrinal footing.  
The circuits disagree on what manifest disregard is (with the Seventh Circuit in particular 
adopting its own, idiosyncratic approach) and how the standard should be applied. Id. at 234-
35 (footnotes omitted).   
 
States are also divided both as to the permissibility of the approach and the application of it.  See id. at 235.  
See also Sooner Builders & Inv., Inc. v. Nolan Hatcher Constr. Servs., L.L.C., 164 P.3d 1063, 1072 nn.14-
15 (Okla. 2007)(collecting state cases adopting or rejecting manifest disregard). 
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 See Drahozal, supra note 277, at 235-38; see generally Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The 
Revolving Door of Justice:  Arbitration Agreements that Expand Court Review of an Award, 19 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL, 861 (2004) (finding challenges to arbitration on manifest disregard grounds fairly frequent 
but unsuccessful more than 90 percent of the time); Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the “Manifest 
Disregard” of the Law Standard:  The Key to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL. 
117, 125-26 (summarizing and categorizing approaches and, although critical of some courts for overly 
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 This situation of greater deference to arbitration than is accorded to trial courts 
made sense in 1925 – even though federal trial judges are selected only after a substantial 
vetting process that includes confirmation by the U.S. Senate while anyone selected by 
the parties can be an arbitrator, regardless of training, intelligence, criminal record or the 
like.
281
  But in 1925, arbitration meant commercial arbitration or specialized industry or 
guild arbitration in which relatively sophisticated repeat players chose arbitrators based 
on the candidate’s knowledge of the business rather than the candidate’s legal 
pedigree.
282
  Because a primary object of the Act was to require courts to give breathing 
space for industry expertise,
283
 it made perfect sense to adopt a deferential standard of 
review. 
 But that was then and this is now.  Arbitration today, although still including the 
commercial and specialized arbitrations of the early 20
th
 Century, is largely composed of 
mass arbitration frequently involving consumers or lower level employees who can 
hardly be viewed as insiders, repeat players, or participants in an industry where dispute 
resolution turns on specialized industry norms.
284
  In mass arbitration, the correct results 
are presumptively results that accord with the substantive law because this type of 
arbitration involves wholesale displacement of a large amount of adjudication with a 
system of privatized dispute resolution without the specialized decisional norms that 
might prevail for certain industries or trades.  Consequently, awards produced through the 
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Challenge of a New Arbitration Paradigm, 23 AM. REV. OF INT’L ARB. 231, 234 (2012) (“The disputes 
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dispute resolution forum offered by the State.”) (footnotes omitted); Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy, 
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Act; largely supported by commercial actors to ensure enforcement of arbitration agreements contained in 
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CLEV. ST. L. REV. 87, 113-116 (2012). 
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 See Stempel, Mandating Minimum Fairness, supra note 11; Schwartz, supra note 248, at 107-08; 
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newer mass arbitration of today must logically comport with substantive law in order to 
merit judicial enforcement. 
 Continuing to use the 1925 concept of § 10 for reviewing mass arbitrations 
resulting from the Court’s dynamic expansion of §§ 2-4 during the past 30 years 
effectively permits arbitrations that err (such as the mythical charitable giving contract 
enforcement discussed above)
285
 to be accorded the force of a judgment when courts 
would themselves regard such a judgment as error.  This is an untenable situation 
requiring change – both to bring statutory construction harmony to the different aspects 
of the Act and to prevent unduly disparate results between arbitration and adjudication. 
 The conventional wisdom, of course, is that this cannot be done without 
amendment of the Act.
286
  But courts can in fact legitimately update the application of     
§ 10 to arbitration without a congressional change in the law.  The Supreme Court’s now-
longstanding dynamic construction of the Act has opened the door to an expanded 
reading of § 10 (and § 1 should the Court ever reverse or sufficiently modify Circuit City 
and Gilmer).
287
  The Court long-ago departed from a strictly textualist or originalist 
approach to the Act and its intent and purpose, at least regarding §§ 2-4
288
 and has 
arguably done so for § 1, albeit in a way many regard as incorrect.
289
  The Court has 
                                                 
285
 See supra notes 273-276 and accompanying text (describing hypothetical arbitration in which 
arbitrator clearly is incorrect regarding the result that would obtain under prevailing law). 
286
 See Welsh, Procedural Safeguards, supra note 268; Cole, supra note 269.  It is a conventional 
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urging expanded judicial review of arbitration awards criticizes Court’s failures in construction and 
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expansion of the Act has effectively barred state regulatory action that touches significantly upon 
arbitration.  See Maureen Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute: The Federal Arbitration Act and 
Displacement of Agency Regulation, 5 PENN. ST. Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 59 (2013). 
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 See supra notes 169-178, 190-198 and accompanying text (discussing Gilmer and Circuit City and 
Court’s narrow construction of § 1 of the Act); see also Stempel, supra note 12. 
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 See supra notes 129-260 (reviewing Court’s modern Arbitration Act jurisprudence). 
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 See Matthew F. Finkin, “Workers’ Contracts” Under the United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in 
Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282 (1996); Stempel, supra note 12; Ronald 
Turner, Employment Discrimination, Labor and Employment Arbitration, and the Case Against Union 
Waiver of the Individual Worker’s Statutory Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 EMORY L.J. 135 (2000); 
Kenneth F. Dunham, Great Gilmer’s Ghost: The Haunting Tale of the Role of Employment Arbitration in 
the Disappearance of Statutory Rights in Discrimination Cases, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 303 (2005); 
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog 
Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).  Although Circuit City and Gilmer took a crabbed 
view of the § 1 employment contract exception, it was not because of applying a conservative approach to 
statutory construction.  If the Court had done so, it could have concluded the exercise in favor of the 
employees in short order, see supra notes 169-178, 190-198 and accompanying text. 
The text of § 1 of the Act is pretty clear:  the imposition of arbitration based on a written agreement is 
not to “apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Under modern notions of interstate 
commerce, which the Court has been happy to invoke to support required arbitration, many workers other 
than sailors and railroad workers qualify, at least as a matter of text.   
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implicitly legitimized dynamic statutory construction as an acceptable approach to 
applying legislation, even if it is unlikely to explicitly say so.   
Although the outcomes of many of the Court’s arbitration cases have been widely 
criticized by scholars and consumer groups, they have been just as fervently supported by 
business interests and some elements of the judiciary attracted by arbitration’s reduction 
in the judicial docket.  And to state the obvious, none of the Justices responsible for this 
dynamic expansion of the Federal Arbitration Act have been the target of impeachment 
actions or similar political retaliation.  The logical conclusion is that the legal body 
politic has now silently accepted statutory dynamism as acceptable mainstream 
jurisprudence even though at times unhappy with the results.  Although the Court’s 1984 
Southland decision has been criticized for its dynamism,
290
 that scholarly critique is 
largely in the rear view mirror and the Justices making this argument have dropped this 
protest.
291
 
 In light of this history, it is now open to courts to view § 10 through a dynamic 
lens – and courts should do so.  Looking at § 10, particularly § 10(4), through this lens 
makes a strong case for providing broader judicial review of arbitration awards stemming 
from modern mass arbitrations and vacating them when they make errors of law or fact 
that would result in reversal of trial court decisions containing the same errors.  However, 
where the arbitration award under review emanates from the type of traditional 
commercial or industry arbitration prevailing at the time of the Act, courts may continue 
to apply § 10 in a deferential manner. Reading § 10 in this dynamic manner in harmony 
with the Court’s post-Southland era comports sufficiently with mainstream jurisprudence.  
Supporters of keeping arbitration less like litigation and relatively free of judicial 
review will undoubtedly not warm to my proposal.
 292
  But traditional judicial deference 
would under my proposal continue to obtain for traditional arbitration.  It bears emphasis 
                                                 
Although the enacting Congress may have had a narrower intent in that they had a specific group in 
mind, this would not (pun slightly intended) derail most conservative judges from applying the text of the 
statute.  To the extent non-textual factors are invoked, they auger in favor of a broader reading of §1 so that 
workers received protection against imposed arbitration akin to what they enjoyed at the time the Act was 
passed.   
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 See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Assault on Judicial Deference, 23 AM. REV. OF INT’L ARB. 
417 (2012).   
53 
 
that the broader, litigation-like appellate review urged in this article would apply only to 
the new, mass arbitration that has supplanted litigation for many consumer and 
employment disputes.  This of course may prompt the criticism that I am being 
inconsistent in a manner similar to the Supreme Court’s differential modes of statutory 
construction in arbitration cases.  My response:  the notion of “imperfect” execution of 
arbitrator power differs depending upon whether the arbitration in question was an 
industry or commercial norms arbitration or was instead the type of modern mass 
arbitration imposed on consumers and employees, which unless otherwise agreed should 
be governed by applicable law rather than insider norms or arbitrary decisions.    
Using that most mainstream of factors, text, a natural reading of the statute would 
permit the conclusion that an arbitrator’s clear legal error would constitute “misbehavior” 
prejudicing the rights of the parties or execution of the arbitrator’s power that was 
executed “so imperfectly” as to require setting aside the award. A textual approach to § 
10(4) can support a more expansive review of awards than courts have traditionally 
accorded.  This provision of the statute provides that arbitration awards should be vacated 
where the arbitration is “so imperfectly executed that a mutual, final, and definite award 
upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”
293
   
The dictionary defines “imperfect” as (of course) “not perfect” and “defective.”
294
   
In matters of modern mass arbitration that do not involve industry norms or particularized 
customs for doing business, the implicit understanding is that although arbitration differs 
from adjudication in procedural formality, the arbitral claimant or defendant will be 
subject to the same law and resolution of factual disputes as is the litigation claimant or 
defendant.  Consequently, an arbitration award that is clearly incorrect in its 
determination of facts or application of law is defective.  
 Thus, to find facts in a clearly incorrect way and to be mistaken regarding the law 
is imperfect.  To “execute” can mean to “perform as required” and to “perform skillfully 
or properly” as in executing a sports play, military maneuver, or other task.
295
  But these 
are secondary definitions to the primary definition of “to carry out fully” or “to put 
completely into effect.”  When reading “execute” in conjunction with the rest of the 
words of § 10(4), the more natural reading of “so imperfectly executed [their powers] that 
a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made” 
suggests that this portion of the Act was focused on defects such as lack of finality, lack 
of clarity, mis-naming of parties, oversight in failing to address a claim, and similar 
defects that are more technical and go less to the substantive merits of the dispute.   
Although text alone does not make a powerful case for expanded § 10 judicial 
review of arbitration awards, the text of the Act does not completely foreclose a 
construction of § 10(4) that invalidates awards when there are palpable errors of fact-
finding or clearly inaccurate application of the law.  While text may be the first-among-
equals of statutory interpretation tools, only the most fundamentalist textualists are 
unwilling to consider other factors.
296
  Because the Court itself, including those 
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professing textualism in other contexts, have treated some portions of the Act 
dynamically, consideration of non-textual factors cannot fairly be foreclosed in trying to 
harmonize § 10 review with other portions of the Court’s modern Federal Arbitration Act 
jurisprudence. 
 Legislative intent unsurprisingly tends to favor a constricted reading of § 10(4), 
and § 10 generally.  As previously noted, the proponents of the Act and Congress 
envisioned arbitration as the consensual commercial, industrial, and guild arbitration of 
insiders, not the modern mass imposition of arbitration on tenuous grounds where 
consent is suspect.  But if the statutory interpreter’s goal is vindication of a specific 
original legislative intent, § 10 does not support review of arbitration that parallels review 
of trial decisions.  
 The general congressional purpose underlying the Act admits more easily of 
expanded judicial review.  Although the Congress of 1925 and the interest groups 
pushing for the Act (e.g., the Chamber of Commerce) did not contemplate today’s mass 
arbitration, neither is there any indication that they wished to expand imposed arbitration 
so broadly or to have large swaths of consumer, employment, or other disputes between 
businesses and individuals transferred to a privatized system with only minimal judicial 
review.  There is actually some indication that the 1925 Congress, had it known what 
would develop in Southland’s wake, would have disapproved.  The enacting Congress 
specifically included § 1 of the Act, barring enforcement of arbitration clauses contained 
in contracts of employment.   
Despite the defanging of this provision in Gilmer and Circuit City, it remains 
standing as a powerful indication that the enacting Congress had considerable misgivings 
about this type of imposed mass arbitration.  That same Congress would likely have held 
similar reservations about imposed mass arbitration of consumer disputes.  Viewed in this 
light, § 10 of the Act may be an apt candidate for the “imaginative reconstruction” 
suggested by Judge Richard Posner, an approach that stops short of a fully evolutionary, 
updating, or Calabresian common law approach but has elements of the dynamic 
approach.  Judge Posner’s suggestion:  when faced with a situation beyond the 
contemplation of the Congress that enacted the statute, courts should attempt to envision 
what the enacting Congress would have done had it contemplated the current situation.
297
  
Given what the 1925 Congress did in § 1, it is not farfetched to conclude that had it 
known that its new law would result in mass arbitration of consumer and other disputes 
pitting business against individuals, that Congress would have wanted § 10 to be 
construed in a manner that provided meaningful judicial policing of such arbitration 
outcomes.  
 Consideration of interest group impact also supports a broader application of        
§ 10(4) when modern mass arbitration is involved.  Scholars divide on the question of 
what to do about the unavoidable influence of interest groups on legislation.  Most 
suggest that courts should attempt to fight against this in various ways and to limit the 
special interest aspects of legislation, even though the language of a statute and its 
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legislative history require that the victorious interest group obtain at least some of the 
spoils of political victory.
298
  Others argue, to again paraphrase Senator Hayakawa, 
assuming that interest groups won fair and square
299
 (e.g., without bribery or coercion by 
merely effective means of the legal means of influencing public policy), that courts 
should construe the law to give the prevailing interest group its full measure of legislative 
victory.
300
   
Under either approach, an interest group analysis of § 10(4) does not limit a 
court’s ability to read it broadly in favor of more expansive judicial review of arbitration 
awards.  The driving forces behind the Act were merchant groups such as the Chamber of 
Commerce.  Their goal was to obtain judicial enforcement of the traditional commercial 
and guild arbitration clauses commonly contained in their contracts.  Although the 
successors to these groups generally like what the Burger, Rehnquist and Roberts Courts 
have done in expanding their ability to impose arbitration en masse upon consumers and 
employees, this was not part of the original interest group activity leading to passage of 
the Act.  Consequently, even under the “conservative” approach more supportive of 
holding fast to the legislative victories of interest groups, there is no compelling reason to 
cleave to a narrow approach to § 10(4).
301
  The more liberal attitude toward interest group 
activity logically supports greater judicial resistance to special interest group legislation 
and thus resistance to a continuing narrow view of § 10 review. 
 While an originalist view of the Act supports the status quo of highly deferential 
review of arbitration awards, a more dynamic approach strongly augers in favor of more 
searching review commensurate with the changes in arbitration wrought by Southland 
and its progeny.  Put simply, it is a foolish consistency that adheres to a limited standard 
of review designed for the commercial insider arbitration of the early 20
th
 Century when 
the early 21
st
 Century is awash in imposed mass arbitration quite different than that 
existing at the time the Act was passed.  Although it would perhaps seem controversial or 
unduly activist for judges to read § 10 more expansively on its own, it is hardly stretching 
the boundaries of apt judicial behavior to give § 10 the same treatment the Court has 
accorded §§ 2-4 for nearly 30 years.   
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Once the door is open to dynamism, its analytic tools logically lead to § 10 review 
of mass arbitration commensurate with judicial review of trial findings and rulings.  A 
purposive or interest group approach also supports this reading of § 10, while the text of 
the section is only slightly adverse and at least subject to a construction in favor of 
expansion.  Even an originalist focus on legislative intent, perhaps the strongest factor 
favoring continued narrow construction of § 10 and highly deferential judicial review, is 
not particularly persuasive in light of the enacting legislature’s understandable ignorance 
of the brave new world of mass arbitration the Court would usher in some 60 years later.  
Weighed against other interpretative factors, this should not be sufficient to prevent more 
expansive § 10(4) review commensurate with the modern world of mass arbitration.      
By contrast, the manifest disregard of law standard is a bit timid in requiring that 
the arbitrator must be apprised of the correct law and willfully disregard it in order to 
make the award vulnerable.
302
   When trial courts err, appellate courts do not hinge their 
reversal on whether the judge was adequately presented with the correct law by the 
parties.  Rather, the judge is expected to find and apply applicable law correctly even in 
the face of bad lawyering.  Now that arbitration has become the new litigation, a similar 
burden should be placed on arbitrators.   
Because of the problems posed by this requirement, which creates unnecessary 
potential for debate as to the state of the record below (i.e., was the arbitrator really 
adequately briefed on the law by counsel), future application of “error of law” review of 
arbitration awards should dispense with this requirement (although continued use of 
manifest disregard review in apt cases is completely consistent with this article’s 
suggested approach).  Scrutiny or an expanded review of arbitration awards for basic 
legal accuracy should become a required part of future arbitration jurisprudence.   If 
arbitration is to replace litigation as a default, it should also include the default rule that 
the award must comply with the substantive law applicable to the dispute. 
 In addition to improving the judicial quality control exerted over arbitration, a 
move toward greater law-based review of arbitration decisions would be jurisprudentially 
satisfying in that it would bring application of § 10 of the Act into harmony with the 
Supreme Court’s construction of the Act as a whole.  Adoption of this approach would 
also reduce the problems posed by Hall Street,
303
 in which the Court refused to permit the 
parties themselves to provide for expanded judicial review.  So long as an arbitration 
agreement does not provide for review beyond the standard form of appellate quality 
control sought in this article (for modern mass arbitration awards), the parties’ agreement 
seeking to customize review should be respected unless it places an undue burden on a 
court or is otherwise substantially inconsistent with the court’s adjudicative role. 
 A loose end of sorts remains.  If this article’s proposed dynamic reading of           
§ 10(4) for modern mass arbitration is adopted, the Hall Street problem is largely 
obviated.  But what about the converse:  an arbitration agreement that provides for review 
even narrower or more deferential than that provided pursuant to § 10.
304
  Hall Street 
suggests that this type of party agreement does not run afoul of the Act or improperly 
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permit the parties to impose on the judiciary because it reduces judicial workload (by 
requiring even less judicial scrutiny than that available pursuant to the § 10).
305
  
But this view is of course subject to question and criticism.  A major rationale for 
expanded arbitration in the Southland era has been the argument that arbitration is not 
substandard justice but simply a type of forum selection.  Even for regular § 10 review, 
this argument is problematic.  Sure, arbitration is a type of forum selection – but it is 
forum selection with substantive implications such as no jury trial, reduced discovery, 
absence of stringent evidentiary rules, as well as highly deferential judicial review in 
place of the norm of appellate review as quality control.   
If the parties are permitted to restrict judicial review even further than the limited 
review provided by § 10, this may reduce the workload of courts but it does so at the cost 
of making arbitration even more substantively different than litigation.  This does not 
pose a significant problem where the arbitration is of the traditional commercial or 
industry variety in existence at the time the Act was passed, arbitrations in which the 
disputants frequently wanted decision based on the specialized or informal norms of their 
fields.  But the continued highly deferential approach to application of § 10 exacerbates 
the problems of modern mass arbitration as a substitute for litigation by making such 
privatized justice even less protective of litigants than ordinary arbitration. 
Consequently, an apt approach to the “reverse-Hall Street” problem should 
continue the apparent norm of allowing parties to restrict review and avoid otherwise 
applicable law in cases involving traditional arbitration.  However, where the dispute is 
subject to modern mass arbitration of the type that did not exist prior to Southland, the 
arbitration agreement should not be permitted to eject the application of law or to avoid 
the dynamic application of § 10(4) advocated in this article.      
V. CONCLUSION  
 Rightly or wrongly, the Supreme Court has during the past 30 years expanded the 
scope of the Federal Arbitration Act through dynamic statutory construction more 
judicially activist than the better known mainstream jurisprudence involving text, 
legislative history, and congressional intent.  As a result of the Court’s efforts, the 
incidence and role of arbitration has expanded well beyond what was intended by the 
enacting Congress or what is mandated by the Act’s text, albeit with some disturbing 
inconsistency that suggests the Court favors arbitration as a tool of business more than as 
an improvement over litigation or as a means of facilitating party autonomy and freedom 
of contract.   
Assuming no retrenchment in this 30-year trend, a glaring problem of asymmetry 
remains.  While compulsion of arbitration has expanded due to the Court’s dynamic 
statutory construction of §§ 2, 3, and 4 of the Act, protection of workers from adhesion 
contracts of arbitration under § 1 of the Act and review of arbitration awards pursuant to 
§ 10 has remained static.  The result is a missed opportunity to exercise greater quality 
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control over arbitration as well as jurisprudential inconsistency.  The Court (or lower 
courts as a precursor to High Court review) can fix this problem by recognizing that – at 
least in modern mass arbitrations imposed on consumers and employees –  that § 10(4) of 
the Act permits courts to vacate arbitration awards reflecting clear errors of factual 
determination or application of law.  Such errors are sufficiently “imperfect” arbitrations 
to justify judicial rejection. 
